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INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota law governing commitments has been substantially 
revised and recodified in the Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982. I 
The prior law2 is repealed and the new law is substituted for it effec-
tive August 1, 1982.3 
The Act is the result of a gradual reform process designed to 
strengthen the due process accorded those subject to commitment 
procedures. Many of the revisions are foreshadowed in existing 
consent decrees. In Vickerman v. Hennepin County Probate Court,4 
detailed changes in the judicial procedures leading to commitment 
were implemented. InAnderson v. Likins,s and Flick v. Noot,6 pro-
cedures were established governing the revocation of provisional 
discharges for those committed as mentally ill and mentally re-
tarded respectively. 
Many of the changes accomplished by the Act can be traced to 
recommendations in the Report of the Supreme Court Study Com-
mission on the Mentally Disabled and the Courts.7 The report con-
I. MINN. STAT. §§ 2538.01-.23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Act). 
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.01-.23 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
3. Proceedings initiated before August I, 1982 are governed by the old law. Proceed-
ings initiated under the prior law and not terminated by August I, 1983 are then governed 
by the new law. Finally, anyone indeterminately committed under prior law is subject to the 
determinate commitment review provisions in the new law not later than February I, 1984. 
/d. 
4. No. 4-78 Civil 376 (D. Minn. 1980). 
5. No. 4-72 Civil 422 (D. Minn. 1974). 
6. No. 4-78 Civil 359·(D. Minn. 1979). 
7. Civil Commitment in Minnesota, Final Report of the Supreme Court Study Commis-
sion on the Mentally Disabled and the Courts (1979). [hereinafter cited as Final Report.) 
The Study was initiated in 1977 to determine whether the courts and other institutions of the 
state were adequately meeting the needs of the mentally disabled and whether court proce-
dures were fair, appropriate, and uniform throughout the state. Among the members of the 
Commission were six psychiatrists, fourteen attorneys, seven institutional officials, represent-
atives of several concerned organizations, public officials, advocates, psychologists, a jour-
nalist and a psychiatric nurse. Id. at ii. The primary emphasis of the Study was on the 
operation of the Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment Act [MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.Ol-
.23 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982»). The Study resulted in 24 Recommendations by the 
Commission. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Hamline L. Rev. 43 1983
41] CIVIL COMMITMENT ACT: 1982 43 
tained twenty-four separate recommendations, the great majority 
concerned the civil commitment process and provided the major im-
petus for the Act.8 Subsequent to the report's publication, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court appointed a commission to implement the 
recommendations, to the extent possible, by court rule. The result 
of the Commission's work was the Special Rules of Procedure Gov-
erning Proceedings Under the Minnesota Commitment Act of 
1982.9 
This article has three purposes. First, the significant changes in 
the civil commitment law are identified and their implications ex-
plored. Second, where appropriate, the legal background underly-
ing the changes is explored in order to place the changes in context. 
Third, the article identifies ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
Act, posits resolutions, and suggests areas for legislative attention. 
I. DISABILITY CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS 
Many of the significant policy changes incorporated in the Act 
are in the definitions section.1O The more important of these 
changes have been made in defining the disability categories, the 
official persons involved in the commitment process and the treat-
ment facilities. 
Each of the definitions of the four disability categories is signifi-
cantly changed by the Act. In addition to making substantive 
changes, the amendments simplify the definitions by avoiding con-
fusing cross-references to the operative portion of the Act. 
Chemically Dependent Person 
The term "chemically dependent person" replaces the term "in-
ebriate person."" The Act retains the bulk ofthe old definition, but 
expands it in an effort to add precision. The old law simply re-
quired finding the person was "incapable of managing himself or his 
affairs by reason of the habitual and excessive use of liquor, narcot-
ics or other drugs."'2 
The Act adds to this rather vague criterion a requirement that 
8. Final Report, supra note 7 at, 61-86. 
9. Special Rules of Procedure Governing Proceedings Under Minnesota Commitment 
Act of 1982. 
10. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (1982). 
II. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (1982) replaces MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 4 
(1980) (repealed August I, 1982) which defined "inebriate persons." 
12. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 4 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
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the person's use of chemicals or drugs poses a "substantial likeli-
hood of physical harm" to self or others as a result of the chemical 
abuse. In adding the requirement of a demonstrated likelihood of 
harm, the Act extends to chemically dependent persons the same 
sort of definitional protections previously provided to persons al-
leged to be mentally ill under the old law. Further, the type of evi-
dence which may be used to demonstrate the likelihood of harm is 
specified. Admissible evidence includes: "(i) a recent attempt or 
threat to do physical harm; (ii) evidence of recent serious physical 
problems; (iii) a failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter 
or medical care for himself." 13 The idea of physical harm is central 
to the new definition. Harm which does not amount to physical 
harm would be insufficient to support a commitment. Examples of 
harm which would not be sufficient to support a commitment in-
clude harm to the family structure of the chemically dependent per-
son; harm to the financial estate of the person through waste or 
mismanagement of assets; "self-destructive" behavior such as miss-
ing work or other obligations; or emotional harm to family and 
friends. 
Mentally III Person 
The new definition of "mentally ill person" modifies and tight-
ens the requirement that some harm be shown in order to commit. 14 
It also makes significant changes in the "non-behavioral" aspect of 
the definition, which specifies the type of mental disability which 
must be demonstrated in order to commit. 
The old law contained a broad definition of "mentally ill per-
son" which provided few interpretive guideposts. The definition in-
cluded any person diagnosed as having a "psychiatric or other 
disorder which substantially impairs his mental health .... "15 The 
Act tightens this definition substantially. The pertinent part of the 
new definition reads, "a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, 
mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or 
understand .... "16 
A full exploration of the implications of the new definition of 
"mentally ill persons" is beyond the scope of this article, and must 
13. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (1982). 
14. Id., subd. 13. 
IS. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 3 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
16. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 13 (1982). 
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await authoritative judicial construction. However, a number of 
points and practical comments about the definition can be made. 
The new definition contains many terms which carry some meaning 
outside of the context of the Act. It must be assumed that each of 
these terms is intended to have some operative effect, that is, includ-
ing certain disorders and excluding others from the definition of 
mentally ill person. 
The definition of mentally ill person might be divided into 
seven elements. 17 The individual must have a disorder which is psy-
chiatric. 18 As noted above, the old definition referred to "psychiat-
ric or other disorders." The legislature must have intended some 
change in meaning by the omission of the word "other."19 The dis-
order must be of one or more of the following: thought, mood, per-
ception, orientation, or memory. These are terms of art for 
psychologists and psychiatrists.2o Careful attention should be paid 
to the technical definitions of these terms in determining whether a 
certain disorder falls within the legal definition of "mentally ill 
person."21 
The disorder must be "substantial" and impair judgment, be-
havior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand. Fi-
nally the impairment must be "gross". The use of the terms 
"substantial" and "gross" is significant. In close cases, practitioners 
17. (I) A disorder, (2) which is psychiatric, (3) of one of enumerated types, (4) which 
is substantial in character, (5) and grossly, (6) impairs, (7) judgment, behavior, capacity to 
recognize reality, or to reason or understand. 
18. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM III). The definition of 
"mental disorder" given there emphasizes that there must be a "behavioral psychologic, or 
biologic disfunction" and that the disturbance not be "limited to a conflict between an indi-
vidual and society .... " Id. at 363. 
19. See Johnson v. Noot, 323 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1982) in which the Minnesota 
Supreme Court discussed the application of the old definition to character disorders. The 
court's language suggests that "character disorders" did not fall within the term "traditional 
psychiatric disorders": 
[W)e hold that a character disorder substantially impairs mental health and there-
fore constitutes mental illness [under prior law] only when the disorder takes away 
the person's ability to control his conduct. Only at that point. . . does the charac-
ter disorder's effect on mental health reach the degree of impairment caused by 
traditional psychiatric disorders. 
Id. at 727. 
20. For example, "mood" is defined as "[a] persuasive and sustained emotion that in the 
extreme, markedly colors the person's perception of the world. Mood is to affect as climate 
is to weather. Common examples of mood 'include depression, elation, anger, and anxiety." 
DSM III, supra note 20, at 363. "Orientation" is defined as "[a]wareness of where one is in 
relation to time, place, and person." Id. at 365. 
21. For example, antisocial personality. 
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should insist upon explication of the examiner's standards in order 
to determine whether or not the impairment is "substantial" or 
"gross" . 
Although it is premature to attempt a definitive comment on 
the new definition, it appears to these authors that the legislature 
intended for the most part to eliminate personality or character dis-
orders22 from the definition. This reading would be consistent with 
22. "Personality disorder" is defined as: 
Deeply ingrained patterns of behavior, which include the way one relates to, re-
ceives, and thinks about the environment and oneself. Personality traits are promi-
nent aspects of personality, and do not imply pathology. Personality disorder 
implies inflexible and maladaptive patterns of sufficient severity to cause either 
significant impairment in adaptive functioning or subjective distress. 
DSM III, supra note 20, at 366 (emphasis in original). 
Indeed it is arguable that the definition includes only psychoses. Thus the definition of 
"mentally ill person" at MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 12 (1982), is strikingly similar to the 
definition of "psychotic" in DSM III, supra note 20, at 367-68: 
PSYCHOTIC. A term indicating gross impairment in reality testing. It may 
be used to describe the behavior of an individual at a given time, or a mental 
disorder in which at some time during its course all individuals with the disorder 
have grossly impaired reality testing. When there is gross impairment in reality 
testing, the individual incorrectly evaluates the accuracy of his or her perceptions 
and thoughts and makes incorrect inferences about external reality, even in the 
face of contrary evidence. The term psychotic does not apply to minor distortions 
of reality that involve matters of relative judgment. For example, a depressed per-
son who underestimated his achievements would not be described as psychotic, 
whereas one who believed he had caused a natural catastrophe would be so de-
scribed. 
Direct evidence of psychotic behavior is the presence of either delusions or 
hallucinations without insight into their pathological nature. The term psychotic is 
sometimes appropriate when an individual's behavior is so grossly disorganized 
that a reasonable inference can be drawn that reality testing is disturbed. Exam-
ples included markedly incoherent speech without apparent awareness by the per-
son that the speech is not understandable, and the agitated, inatttentive, and 
disoriented behavior seen in Alcohol Withdrawal Delirium. 
The term psychotic was applied to individuals whose "mental functions [were] 
sufficiently impaired to interfere grossly with their capacity to meet the ordinary 
demands of life," whether or not there was impaired reality testing. AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968). This definition of psychotic did not conform to common 
usage, which generally limited the use of the term to impairment in reality testing, 
as does the DSM III definition. As a result, the value of the term for communica-
tion was diminished, since it was then unclear whether or not an individual de-
scribed as being psychotic had gross impairment in reality testing. It should also 
be noted that an individual with a nonpsychotic mental disorder may exhibit 
psychotic behavior, though rarely. For example, an individual with Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder may at times come to believe in the reality of the danger of 
being contaminated by shaking hands with strangers. 
In DSM III the psychotic disorders include Pervasive Developmental Disorders, Schiz-
ophrenic and Paranoid Disorders, Psychotic Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified, some Or-
ganic Mental Disorders, and some Affective Disorders. 
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the Minnesota Supreme Court's recent holding in Johnson v. Noot,23 
that character disorders are not included under the old law except 
where the disorder takes away the person's ability to control his con-
duct. However, individual evaluations might show that some people 
with character disorders still fit the definition. Nevertheless, the 
main thrust of the new definition seems to be toward including only 
traditional "psychiatric" disorders.24 To the extent others pose dan-
ger to society through violent behavior which violates the criminal 
law, they are more properly dealt with in the criminal justice system. 
Traditional psychiatric hospitals are generally not equipped to deal 
with people whose danger to society stems from a personality disor-
der. Society is less likely to think of these individuals as "ill", and 
more likely to think of them as "bad." Additionally, as opposed to 
those with psychotic illnesses, persons with personality disorders do 
not exhibit the lack of orientation and impaired perceptual system 
which often leads to a sense of reduced legal and social 
responsibility. 
The definition of mentally ill person continues in two addi-
tional segments. The first requires that the psychiatric disorder be 
"manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty per-
ceptions."25 This requirement is added to insure that only those dis-
orders which have had some impact on the person's interaction with 
the outside world are included. For example, the report of the 
Supreme Court Study Commission26 emphasized the need to sup-
port petitions for commitment with "factual statements in behav-
ioral terms." 
Finally, the definition requires a "substantial likelihood of 
physical harm" to self or others. As with the definition of chemi-
cally dependent person,27 this definition specifies that the types of 
23. 323 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1982). 
24. Note that in DSM III personality disorders are catalogued on Axis II, separately 
from the more Florid Axis I disorders. See also Bursten, What If Antisocial Personality Is 
An Illness, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 97 (1982). 
Id. 
25. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 13 (1982). 
26. Final Report, supra note 7, at 79. Recommendation 15 provides: 
The petition should contain factual descriptions of the proposed patient's recent 
behavior, where it occurred, and over what period of time it occurred. Each fac-
tual allegation should be supported by observations of witnesses who are named in 
the petition. Petitions should contain factual statements in behavioral terms and 
should not contain judgmental or conclusory statements. 
27. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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behavioral evidence which must be used to demonstrate likelihood 
of harm are: 
(i) A recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others; 
(ii) A failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter or medi-
cal care for himself, as a result of the impairment.28 
The first behavioral element changes the old law in three ways. 
First, it requires that the attempt or threat be recent. Second, the old 
law did not include threats to harm others.29 Finally, the old law 
required a demonstrated threat or attempt to cause serious physical 
harm, while the new law makes no mention of the degree of harm 
required. 
The second behavioral element varies from the old law in two 
ways. The new law omits failure to protect oneself from exploita-
tion.30 To the extent that the exploitation causes physical harm or 
deprives the person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical 
care, it would still be covered by the definition. If the exploitation 
does not rise to that level, guardianship, conservatorship or other 
forms of protective services might still be available.31 The old law 
also referred to failure to "care for his own needs for food, clothing, 
shelter, safety or medical care".32 The new law omits "safety", and 
makes clear that only failure to provide "necessary" services is 
grounds for commitment. It would, of course, be impermissible 
bootstrapping to include failure to obtain psychiatric care within the 
definition of "medical care."33 
28. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 13 (1982). 
29. Under the old law, a threat of suicide was sufficient to satisfy this behavioral ele-
ment. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 17(a) (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
30. Under the old law, this behavioral element could be satisfied by a showing that the 
proposed patient "failed to protect himselffrom exploitation from others." Id. At times this 
provision was interpreted to include exploition that was strictly material and posed no threat 
of physical harm to the proposed patient. 
31. Under MINN. STAT. § 525.54 subd. 3 (1982) a guardian or conservator of the estate 
may be appointed for a person "who is impaired to the extent that he lacks sufficient under-
standing or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his estate or 
financial affairs ..... " Social Security and welfare benefits can often be protected from 
dissipation through exploitation by means of a "protective" or representative payee. For 
example, 20 C.F.R. § 404. 2001 (1981) provides: 
When it appears to the [Social Security] Administration that the interest of a bene-
ficiary entitled to a payment ... would be served thereby, certification of payment 
may be made by the Administration, regardless of the legal competency or incom-
petency of the beneficiary entitled thereto, either for direct payment to such benefi-
ciary, or for his use and benefit to a relative or some other person and the 
'representative payee' of the beneficiary. 
32. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 17 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
33. The whole purpose of the Act is to determine which persons are to be required to 
undergo involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. The universe from which these persons are 
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Mentally Retarded Person 
The Act adopts the term "mentally retarded person" in place of 
"mentally deficient person."34 The new definition retains the core of 
the old, stating "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning ex-
isting concurrently with demonstrated deficits in adaptive behav-
ior .... "35 Following the pattern set by the mental illness 
definition, the drafters have limited the definition of mentally re-
tarded persons to those who "pose a substantial likelihood of physi-
cal harm" to self or others. As with the other two disability 
categories, the types of behavioral evidence which can be used to 
demonstrate the likelihood of harm are set OUt.36 
In a change from the old law, the new definition of "mentally 
retarded person" omits failure to protect against exploitation as a 
ground for commitment.37 The drafters evidently felt that remedies 
less drastic than commitment could respond to exploitation which 
did not produce any danger of physical harm.38 With respect to 
physical harm to self or others, the old definition included only at-
tempts to do serious harm, and was not limited to recent attempts.39 
Person MenIally 111 and Dangerous 
In framing the new definition of "person mentally ill and dan-
gerous to the public, "40 the Act sharpens the distinction between this 
category and the definition of mentally ill person.41 The definition is 
in two major parts. First, it includes only those persons who are 
designated is, of course, the class of persons who refuse psychiatric care. If such refusal is, in 
and of itself, sufficient to satisfy the behavioral element of the statute, then there would be 
no role for the other behavioral elements. This follows from the fact that all of those for 
whom involuntary commitment is appropriate must, by definition, have refused appropriate 
psychiatric care, thus making the other behavioral elements superfluous. 
34. MINN STAT. § 2538.02 subd 14 (1982). 
35. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
36. These are basically the same behavioral elements as apply to the definition of men-
tally ill persons, (i) a recent threat or attempt to physically harm self or others, or (ii) a 
"failure and inability to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, safety, or medical care." 
See supra text accompanying note 28. 
37. Compare with the definition of "mentally ill" persons, supra note 17. 
38. For example, under the Mental Retardation Protection Act, the Commissioner of 
Public Welfare can be appointed guardian or conservator of a mentally retarded person "in 
need of the supervision and protection of a conservator or guardian." MINN. STAT. § 252A 
subd. \0 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). No showing of physical harm is necessary for 
such an appointment to be appropriate. 
39. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
40. Hereinafter referred to as M.I. & D. 
41. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 17 (1982). See supra notes 16-35. 
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"mentally ill."42 This represents a clarification of the old law, which 
included mentally deficient persons, as well as those found to be 
mentally il1.43 Second, the definition requires a finding that the per-
son "as a result of that mental illness presents a clear danger to the 
safety of others .... "44 This must be demonstrated by two facts. 
First, that there has been an "overt act causing or attempting to 
cause serious physical harm to another;" and second, that there is a 
"substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of 
inflicting serious physical harm on another."45 
The phrase "as a result of that mental illness," is a change from 
the old language. It is intended to limit the application of the men-
tally ill and dangerous (MI&D) label to those whose dangerousness 
is caused by their mental illness. 
This definition, in contrast to those for the other disability cate-
gories, refers to "serious" physical harm. Mere threats of harm 
would be insufficient to satisfy the definition, although there is no 
requirement that the person have succeeded in his attempts to inflict 
serious harm. Threats, of course, might be relevant in satisfying the 
second part of the "danger" definition, the prediction of future 
harm. However, in order to satisfy that part of the definition, it is 
insufficient to show merely that the person is likely to attempt to 
harm another. It must be shown that the attempt will be "capable" 
of inflicting serious harm. This, presumably, would require a show-
ing that the person has both the intent and the means to inflict harm. 
Examiner 
The Act defines "examiner" as "a licensed physician or a li-
censed consulting psychologist, knowledgeable, trained and practic-
ing in the diagnosis and treatment of the alleged impairment."46 The 
definition of "examiner" contains a number of significant changes. 
Under the old law, psychologists could be used as examiners only 
where a licensed physician "especially qualified in the diagnosis of 
mental illness" was unavailable.47 Under the new law, a licensed 
consulting psychologist may be used without any such restriction. 
In addition, any examiner whether physician or psychologist, must 
42. Id., subd. 17. 
43. MINN. STAT. § 252A.02 subd. 17 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
44. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 17 (1982). 
45. Id. 
46. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 7 (1982). 
47. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 6 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
HeinOnline -- 6 Hamline L. Rev. 51 1983
41] CIVIL COMMITMENT ACT: 1982 51 
be qualified in the particular disability area involved. Psychiatrists 
may not fit that definition with respect to chemical dependency and 
mental retardation. Of particular import is the requirement that the 
examiner actually be practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of 
the alleged impairment. This could eliminate the "professional wit-
ness" from eligibility to serve as an examiner. 
Note that the term "examiner" has a much broader application 
in the Act than it did under the old law. The term formerly referred 
solely to persons who were appointed by the court to examine the 
proposed patient prior to commitment. Now the term is used in a 
number of other contexts.48 The use of the term in these contexts 
should not be understood as requiring the court to appoint the same 
"examiners" it appoints to undertake the statutory examination. 
Rather, the use of the term indicates that the statements supporting 
emergency holds and petitions must be made by persons - either 
physiCians or licensed consulting psychologists - knowledgeable, 
trained and practicing in the field involved. 
Health Officer 
The Act makes two changes in the definition of "health of-
ficer".49 In addition to changing the archaic "certified consulting 
psychologist" to "licensed consulting psychologist", it adds "for-
mally designated members of a pre-petition screening unit estab-
lished by § 253B.07." Health officers have the power to take a 
person into custody pursuant to the provision for emergency holds. 50 
Since the Act provides no guidelines at all as to who may be a mem-
ber of the pre-petition screening unit, this change in the Act signifi-
cantly broadens the class of persons who may use the health officer's 
hold.51 
48. For example, an emergency hold requires a statement of an examiner. MINN. STAT. 
§ 253B.05 subd. 1 (1982). Any petition for judicial commitment must be accompanied by a 
statement from an examiner to the effect that he has recently examined the subject and 
believes that commitment is appropriate. MINN STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 2 (1982). 
49. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 16 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982) provided that a 
"health officer" was "a licensed physician, certified consulting psychologist, psychiatric so-
cial worker, or psychiatric or public health nurse." 
50. MINN. STAT. § 253B.05 subd. 2 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 107-123. 
51. The "pre-petition screening unit" is appointed by the designated agency to conduct 
an investigation to determine whether commitment is appropriate. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 
subd. 1 (1982). 
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Treatment Facility 
The Act makes one final important definitional change. The 
definition of the new term "treatment facility" closely parallels the 
definition of "hospital" in the old law. 52 "Treatment facility" means 
a "hospital, community mental health center, or other institution 
qualified to provide care, and treatment for mentally ill, mentally 
retarded, or chemically dependent persons."53 The change in name 
was made to emphasize the Act's mandate that commitment be to 
the least restrictive appropriate setting, which might not be a 
hospital. 54 
II. PATIENTS' RIGHTS 
The Act collects in one section a number of provisions of the 
old law.55 While many of the changes are not of major significance, 
there are a few changes of policy that must be considered. 
Correspondence Rights 
Correspondence rights may be restricted only where the "med-
ical welfare" of the patient requires it.56 Otherwise, patients may 
"correspond freely without censorship." Visitation with personal 
physicians, spiritual advisors and counsel must be permitted at all 
reasonable times.57 
Consent 
In the section dealing with consent for medical procedures,58· 
the Act changes the emphasis of the old law, with no major change 
in meaning. 59 As before, consent is required prior to surgical opera-
tions. Under the old law, the consent of the patient was required 
only when the head of the hospital determined that he had "suffi-
cient capacity to make a responsible decision."60 In other cases, 
52. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 8 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982) defined "hospital" 
as: "a public or private hospital, community mental health center, or other institution or 
part thereof equipped to provide care and treatment for mentally ill, mentally deficient, or 
inebriate persons." 
53. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 19 (1982). 
54. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.09 subd. I (1982). 
55. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 (1982). 
56. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 2 (1982). 
57. Id., subd. 3. 
58. Id., subd. 6. 
59. MINN. STAT. § 253A.17 subd. 8 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
60. Id. 
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"substitute" consent from a guardian, relative, or head of hospital, 
was sufficient. The new law changes the implicit presumption of 
incapacity. Under the new law, consent is required from adult pa-
tients unless the patient is subject to guardianship or conservator-
ship, the head of the facility determines that the patient is not 
competent to consent, or there is an emergency.61 
Consent to both surgical and medical procedures is now re-
quired; formerly the consent requirement specifically applied only 
to surgery. But the Act excludes treatment for mental illness, 
mental retardation or chemical dependency from the broad require-
ment for prior consent. This exclusion represents the Legislature's 
reluctance to deal with the thorny problem of involuntary treatment 
for committed persons.62 The new language apparently leaves the 
law where it stood with regard to such treatment. There is no statu-
tory law regulating the involuntary treatment of committed persons. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated the constitutionally 
required standards governing involuntary "intrusive" treatment, 
such as electroshock therapy.63 By excluding the treatment of 
mental illness, mental retardation and chemical dependency from 
the consent section, the legislature has said nothing affirmative 
about the subject. The section does not say that such treatment may 
be carried on without prior consent. Rather, it simply excludes such 
treatment from the statutory requirement of prior consent. Other 
sources of law - such as the Constitution or administrative rules 
and regulations - may well impose consent requirements.64 In ad-
61. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 6 (1982). 
62. The issue of involuntary treatment entails a number of difficult questions. First, to 
what extent is "consent" a requirement for treatment of committed persons? To the extent 
that it is a requirement, who is competent (legally) to give consent? Does commitment ipso 
faCIO render the patient incompetent to give or withhold consent? If not, how does one 
judge such competence? If the patient is incompetent, who can give "substitute" consent? 
Are there limitations on the types of treatment for which substitute consent is adequate, or 
the circumstances under which it can (or must) be exercised? Can the state force treatment 
without obtaining consent, either direct or substitute? If so, under what circumstances? Is 
involuntary institutionalization so inherently coercive as to make truly voluntary consent a 
fiction? 
63. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976) (once action is justified by 
compelling state interest, the least restrictive means must be used). See also Rogers v. Okin, 
478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), ajJ'd in parI, rev'd in parI, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), 
vacaled and remanded sub. nom., Mills v. Rodgers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). 
64. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), o/f'd in parI, rev'd in 
parI, 654 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacaled and remanded sub. nom., Mills v. Rodgers, 102 S. 
Ct. 2442 (1982); Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976). 
The Minnesota Department of Public Welfare has a written policy governing the invol-
untary administration of major tranquilizers in State hospitals. Minnesota Department of 
Public Welfare, Institutions Manual, Part XII (1981). The Policy allows for involuntary 
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dition, the legislature recently instructed the Department of Public 
Welfare to promulgate rules governing the imposition of "aversive 
and deprivation" procedures on mentally retarded persons.65 If the 
rules follow the pattern of previously proposed rules on the same 
subject,66 they will certainly contain extensive requirements regard-
ing prior informed consent for such treatment procedures. 
Right to Treatment 
The new Act repeats verbatim, the language of old law enunci-
ating the "[R]ight to receive proper care and treatment, best 
. adapted, according to contemporary professional standards, to ren-
dering further custody, institutionalization, or other services unnec-
essary'."67 This right takes on new significance however, because it is 
now tied to the commitment determination made by the court. The 
Act provides that if commitment is warranted, it shall be to the 
"least restrictive treatment facility which can meet the patient's 
treatment needs consistent with" the right to treatment section.68 
The right to treatment section,69taken in conjunction with the com-
mitment section, should have a substantial impact. It should pre-
vent "dumping" of committed patients into community facilities 
which are not appropriate for their treatment needs; and it should 
prevent overly restrictive commitment - that is, commitment to a 
hospital when a community-based facility would be appropriate. It 
could also be used to defend against the commitment of persons 
with special needs to state hospitals which are not equipped to pro-
vide adequate treatment.70 
Medical Records 
The provIsIon entitled "Medical Records" entails a major 
change from prior law.71 The old Hospitalization and Commitment 
Act did not address the right of access to medical records. A law of 
administration of major tranquilizers in "emergencies" involving "almost certain risk of im-
minent physical harm" and in certain non-emergency situations, Id., at 3000. Non-emer-
gency administration is allowed only when the "patient lacks the ability to engage in a 
rational decision-making process" regarding the medications. Id. at 4030. 
65. Act of March 23, 1982, ch. 637, § I, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1521 (West). 
66. See, e.g., Proposed Dept. Pub. WeI. Rule 39, 4 S!R. \027 (Dec. 12, 1979). 
67. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd 7 (1982) replaces MINN. STAT. § 253A.17 subd. 9 
(1980) (repealed August 1, 1982). 
68. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 1 (1982). 
69. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 7 (1982). 
70. For example, hearing impaired persons and autistically impaired persons. 
71. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 8 (1982). 
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general applicability provides for access but allows hospitals and 
doctors to limit access under certain circumstances.72 The new law 
essentially removes all barriers to a committed person's access to his 
or her medical records. 
The section has two main provisions. First, it states that a "pa-
tient" has the "right to access to his medical records."73 This provi-
sion apparently allows unlimited access by committed patients to 
their medical records. In addition, the use of the term "institution-
alized" in the definition of "patient" suggests that persons who are 
in facilities under the emergency hold or informal admission provi-
sions of the Act, but not committed, also have such access to their 
records. 
The second part of the access section deals with people who are 
"subject to a proceeding or receiving services pursuant to" the Act.74 
Such persons are granted the same access to medical records with 
regard to their commitment as institutionalized persons. This provi-
sion would allow "proposed patients" to obtain records from previ-
ous hospitalizations, as well as current records, if they were needed 
in or relevant to current commitment proceedings. The use of the 
term "complete access" suggests that the access provision is to be 
broadly construed. 
The Civil Commitment Rules of Procedure provide additional 
guidance about access to medical records.75 Upon request, a party 
in a commitment proceeding must allow the other party access to 
medical records in the first party's control. The court is instructed to 
exclude from evidence any "testimony based upon" or any portion 
of any medical record "improperly withheld." The term "improp-
erly withheld" evidently refers not only to records which the Peti-
tioner failed to provide to the proposed patient upon request, but 
also to records which a hospital or other provider failed to make 
available to the proposed patient pursuant to the statute. Note that 
the option of excluding records is available by rule, only to the pro-
posed patient. 
Right to Counsel 
The proposed patient's right to counsel has long been a part of 
72. MINN STAT. § 144.335 (1982). 
73. "Patient" is defined as any person "institutionalized or committed" under the Act. 
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. IS (1982). 
74. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 8 (1982). 
75. MINN. R. CIY. COMMITMENT 5. 
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Minnesota Commitment Law.76 The Supreme Court Study Com-
mission found, "[I]t is clear that there is no uniformly accepted role 
for the proposed patient's counsel in [commitment] proceedings."77 
The Commission set out extensive recommendations regarding the 
role of the proposed patient's attorneys. 
In the subdivision dealing with right to counsel, the legislature 
implemented the key parts of the Commission's Recommendaton.78 
These are the appointment of counsel immediately upon the petition 
being filed; the requirement that counsel be available "throughout 
the proceeding;" and the definition of the role of counsel as that of 
"vigorous advocate" for his client. The Civil Commitment Proce-
dural Rules elaborate on these basic themes, adopting many of the 
more detailed parts of Recommendation 6.79 Counsel is to be ap-
pointed when a petition for commitment is filed. A proposed pa-
tient is entitled to an appointed attorney "at any proceeding" under 
the Act. Once appointed, a lawyer must continue to represent the 
proposed patient unless released by the court. Thus, the lawyer'S 
duty clearly extends beyond representing the proposed patient at the 
commitment hearing. Counsel must also be provided for: any ap-
peal that is taken, proceedings to review a commitment, and pro-
ceedings initiated by the proposed patient to obtain his release.8o In 
addition, it appears that persons committed as mentally ill and dan-
gerous are entitled to counsel at special review board hearings, if 
these are considered to be proceedings "under the Act." Patients on 
provisional discharge are entitled to counsel in connection with pro-
ceedings to revoke the provisional discharge.81 
The Act specifies that the proposed patient's counsel "shall ad-
76. The old law read as follows: 
The proposed patient shall be afforded an opportunity to be represented by coun-
sel, and if neither the proposed patient nor others provide counsel, the court at the 
time the examiners or licensed physicians are appointed shall appoint counsel to 
represent the proposed patient. Counsel shall consult with the proposed patient 
prior to the hearing and shall be given adequate time to prepare therefore. 
MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 15 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
Under the old law, the right to appointed counsel did not depend upon the proposed 
patients' inability to afford counsel. This feature properly takes account of the fact that 
some, if not most, proposed patients, may not be competent to waive the right to counsel. 
Thus, to ensure that the right is protected, the court must appoint counsel even for those who 
can afford it. 
77. Final Report, supra note 7, at 71 (Recommendation 6). 
78. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 9 (1982). 
79. MINN. R. CIY. COMMITMENT 3 and 4. 
80. MINN. STAT. § 2538.17 (1982). See also MINN. R. CIY. COMMITMENT 3. 
81. MINN. STAT. § 2538.15 subd. 3 (1982). 
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vocate vigorously on behalf [of his client]."82 This mandate should 
put to rest the controversy which has raged over the proper role of 
the proposed patient's counsel. The term "vigorous advocate" is not 
consistent with the position advanced by some, that the proposed 
patient's counsel is to function in a role akin to that of a guardian ad 
litem, deciding what is "in the best interests" of the proposed pa-
tient, and acquiescing in commitment if such a course appeared 
best. 83 The Act makes clear that, as in other proceedings, counsel 
should take his instructions from his client, and advocate vigorously 
within ethical bounds for that position. Moreover, the role of advo-
cate for his client is ethically mandated.84 Advocacy has also been 
urged as the proper role by the American Bar Association. 85 
The role of the attorney as a forceful advocate for his client 
cannot be overemphasized. Many helping professionals will be tell-
ing the client to follow the course they believe to be in his best inter-
est. Only the attorney will be representing the client's stated goal. If 
the attorney abdicates his role, the client will have no one on whom 
to rely. 
The role of counsel as a "vigorous advocate" is characteristic of 
the adversary system. The adversary method of justice is particu-
larly important in cases of civil commitment. There is evidence 
showing this method is especially helpful in counteracting bias on 
behalf of the decision-maker.86 Furthermore, the adversary system 
"introduces a systematic evidentiary bias in favor of the party disad-
vantaged by the discovered facts,"87 because advocates confronted 
with initially unfavorable facts more vigorously investigate the situ-
ation. Given the involvement of psychiatrists, psychologists, social 
82. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 9 (1982). See also MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 4.01. 
83. For example, in comments submitted to the Minnesota Supreme Court in connec-
tion with the Court's consideration of the proposed Special Rules of Procedure Governing 
Proceedings Under the Hospitalization and Commitment Act, one attorney suggested the 
following system: 
A more workable system [than the proposed "advocacy model"] would be for the 
court to apfoint lawyers [as] guardians ad litem and not as counsel. The guardian 
ad litem would exercise fiduciary responsibility. If a lawyer as guardian ad litem 
believes it is in the patient's best interests to fight a proposed commitment, he 
should be able to request the court to appoint him counsel and then he could act as 
an advocate. 
84. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1160 (1971). 
85. ABA Comm. on the Mentally Disabled, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: 
Proposals for Change 286 (1981). 
86. See Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision-
making, 86 HARv. L. REV. 386 (1972). 
87. Lind, Thibaut, & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and 
Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1143 (1973). 
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workers, family members and many others, and the general percep-
tion of treatment as a positive factor, these counteracting effects of 
the adversary system are vitaL Finally, there is evidence that advo-
cacy is effective in reducing the number of commitments in two 
ways: the number of court-ordered releases rises and psychiatrists 
are more likely to discharge patients without seeking commitment.88 
Without effective advocacy, the determination of a client's fu-
ture will be abdicated to the "medical, more particularly the psychi-
atric, profession with the legal process and the attorney assuming a 
ceremonial function."89 Commitment is a legal act. The power of 
the state, properly invoked, is the agent forcing someone into treat-
ment. "[W]henever unalterable interferences with bodily integrity 
place deprivations of liberty in issue, the law and not medicine is the 
ultimate decision-maker."90 It violates the fundamental principles 
of the legal system to allow the decision to become effectively non-
judiciaL FUlthermore, treatment may not really be in the client's 
best interest: 
The attorney who focuses on the parens patriae foundation for 
civil commitment overlooks the deprivation of freedom involved 
in these proceedings. He also overlooks other deprivations that 
accompany involuntary placement in a mental hospital. A com-
mitted person loses his right to privacy because he is under con-
stant observation by both hospital staff and other patients; he 
may lose his autonomy through compulsory medication and 
other intrusive treatment. A committed person may be subjected 
to a hospital that is inadequately staffed, overcrowded, unsani-
tary, deplorably maintained and unable to offer protection from 
the brutality of patients and attendants. A committed person suf-
fers the social stigma of being a hospitalized mental patient, and 
worse, one who has been found dangerous enough to be forcibly 
hospitalized. This stigma also may involve more serious long 
term consequences, such as the inability to obtain employment. 
Attention to the negative consequences of involuntary hospitali-
zation may undermine the attorney's view of civil commitment as 
beneficent. 9 I 
88. Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalization: Opinions and Allitudes of Psychia-
trists and Lawyers, 13 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 201 (1972). 
89. Cohan, The Function of the Allorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 111,44 TEX. 
L. REV. 424, 424-25 (1966). 
90. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 166 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 102 
S. Ct. 2452 (1982). 
91. Hiday, The Allorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 
1045-46 (1982). 
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At a more abstract level, a paternalistic proceeding damages the 
public perception of justice. The adversary system is familiar to the 
public and is more likely to be perceived as fair.92 The United 
States Supreme Court has stated: "Departures from established 
principles have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, 
but in arbitrariness."93 These departures demean both the client and 
the legal system. The lawyer is charged with protecting both. 
Occasionally a client may direct his attorney not to contest a 
commitment petition. If the client is making a rational decision, the 
attorney should, of course, follow the client's direction.94 If the cli-
ent is unable to make rational decisions or communicate effectively, 
then the attorney may seek the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem.95 
III. INFORMAL ADMISSION PROCEDURE 
The Act's preference for voluntary treatment is explicit.96 This 
preference is implicit in the provision which requires a finding that 
no less restrictive alternative to commitment exists before an order 
for commitment can be issued.97 It is also consistent with the Min-
nesota Alcoholism and Intoxication Act which specifies a preference 
for treating alcoholics voluntarily.98 Most important, the preference 
for voluntarism is constitutionally required.99 
The Act's provision for informal admission has two important 
elements. First, anyone age sixteen or over may request admission 
as an informal patient. 100 A hospital may admit some minors for 
voluntary care and treatment, although payment may have to be 
arranged with an adult. Second, the statute states that "[t]he head of 
the facility shall not arbitrarily withhold consent to informed hospi-
talization."101 Some treatment facilities are reluctant to accept vol-
unteers. This provision emphasizes state policy favoring 
voluntarism, and is intended to make these denials less frequent. 
92. See Thibaut, Lind, & Walker, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 
(1974). 
93. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967). 
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 212 (Alternative Draft, 1981). 
95. Id. at 199 and 213 (DR7-101). See also MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 13. 
96. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 subd. 1 (1982) provides "Informal admission by consent is 
preferred over involuntary commitment." 
97. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 subd. 2 (1982). 
98. MINN. STAT. § 254A.02 (1982). 
99. Price v. Shepard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 90S (1976). 
100. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 subd. 1 (1982). 
101. Id. 
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Any patient informally admitted must be informed of his right 
to leave the facility within twelve hours of his request for admission 
unless he is held under another provision of the Act, or was admit-
ted as chemically dependent. 102 Anyone admitted as chemically de-
pendent may leave within seventy-two hours after his request, 
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. 103 The patient's re-
quest to leave must be wJitten and submitted to the head of the 
treatment facility.l04 After receiving a request to leave, the head of 
the facility must either honor the request or petition for commitment 
of the person. This petition is mandatory if the head of the treat-
ment facility deems it in the "best interests" of the patient, his fam-
ily or the public. 105 
Under the Act a great deal more than the proposed patient's 
"best interests" must be alleged in a petition in order to state any 
cognizable cause of action. The head of the treatment facility'S obli-
gation to file a petition when he believes it to be in the "best inter-
ests" of the patient, his family or the public, must be read in 
conjunction with the statutory criteria for commitments. 106 
IV. EMERGENCY HOLD 
Anyone may be admitted for emergency care and treatment if 
the head of the facility consents after receiving a written report from 
an examiner.107 The examiner's report must show that the person 
was examined not more than fifteen days earlier; is in imminent 
danger of causing injury to himself or others if not immediately re-
strained; is mentally ill, mentally retarded or chemically dependent; 
and that a court order cannot be obtained in time to prevent the 
injury. lOS 
The contents of the report must be behavioral and specific 
enough to allow review; mere conclusions are insufficient. 109 A copy 
of the examiner's report must be served on the patient immediately 
102. MINN. STAT. § 2538.04 subd. 2 (1982). 
103. Id. 
104. !d. 
105. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 3 (1982). 
106. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 (1982). 
107. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. I (1982). 
108. Id. Recall that an "examiner" is a physician or licensed consulting psychologist who 
is "trained and practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of the alleged impairment." See 
supra note 46-48 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 26, 33, & 36 describing the requisite behavioral descriptions. 
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upon admission. The facility must keep a duplicate. I 10 
Police and health officers may also institute an emergency 
hold. III A peace or health officer may take a person into custody 
and transport him to a treatment facility if the officer has reason to 
believe the person is in imminent danger of harming himself or 
others if not immediately restrained and is either mentally ill, men-
tally retarded or chemically dependent. 112 The officer must make 
application for admission of the person to the treatment facility. 
Like the examiner's statement supporting emergency confine-
ment,l13 the officer's application must specify the reasons and cir-
cumstances for the detention. A copy of the officer's statement must 
be "made available" to the person held. I 14 
After a person is brought to a treatment facility and application 
for admission has been made by the peace or health officer, the per-
son may be admitted for emergency care and treatment if the head 
of the facility consents and there is a written statement from the 
medical officer on duty after a preliminary examination. This state-
ment must be to the effect that the person is in imminent danger of 
harming himself or others, and has symptoms of mental illness, re-
tardation or chemical dependency.115 Admission to the facility is 
not automatic upon the application of the police or health officer; 
the preliminary examination provides additional assurance that ad-
mission is for a proper purpose. Note that this statement, unlike the 
statement supporting the "head of the treatment facility" hold, need 
not be made by an "examiner." Therefore, the statement will not be 
insufficient merely because the medical officer on duty is not knowl-
edgeable, trained and practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of 
the particular disability involved. 
These provisions for emergency holds allow curtailment of civil 
rights on relatively weak grounds. To limit the danger of abuse, the 
110. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. I (1982). 
Ill. A "peace officer" is either a sheriff, municipal, or other local police officer or a State 
Highway Patrol officer engaged in the authorized duties of his office. MINN. STAT. 
§ 2538.02 subd. 16 (1982). A "health officer" is one licensed to practice medicine in Minne-
sota, a medical officer of the United States performing his official duties, a licensed consult-
ing psychologist, a psychiatric social worker, a psychiatric nurse, a public health nurse, or 
members of a formally designated pre-petition screening team. Id., subd. 9 & 12. 
112. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 2 (1982). If the person is believed to be chemically 
dependent but not a danger to person or property, the officer may return the person to his 
home. 
1l3. See supra notes 26, 33, & 36. 
114. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 2 (1982). 
115. Id. 
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duration of the emergency confinement is limited to 72 hours, ex-
cluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.116 Tacking two or 
more consecutive holds violates the Act. This is not to say only one 
such hold can be used during the course of a long hospitalization. 
However, it would be improper to use emergency holds in such a 
way as to create a period of involuntary hospitalization longer than 
seventy-two hours. It would be improper to use a second period of 
emergency detention unless a period of truly voluntary hospitaliza-
tion had intervened subsequent to the first emergency hold. A pe-
riod of hospitalization would be truly voluntary if the patient knew 
of, and understood, his right to leave the hospital if he so chose. 
A person may be held longer than seventy-two hours only upon 
a court order issued in a commitment proceeding.117 If the head of 
the facility believes a petition for commitment is "required" and 
none has been filed, then he must petition. It should be emphasized 
that a petition for commitment is not required after every seventy-
two hour hold. There is evidently a belief by some facilities that a 
petition must follow emergency confinement. Perhaps this is an ef-
fort to avoid future liability by showing good faith. Whatever the 
reason, a petition is unwarranted unless the head of the facility be-
lieves one is needed for protection of the patient or others. 
At the written request of the patient, and with the consent of 
the treatment facility, anyone admitted on an emergency hold must 
be changed to informal status. liS This underscores the point that a 
commitment petition is not inevitable. Emergency provisions are 
available for crisis management. After the crisis has passed, the per-
son has his usual opportunity to receive voluntary care and 
treatment. 
Anyone held under the emergency provisions must be in-
formed, in writing at the time of admission, of his rights: to leave 
after seventy-two hours, to have a medical exam within forty-eight 
hours, to have the venue of any commitment petition changed to his 
Minnesota county of residence I 19 and to become an informal pa-
tient. 120 Furthermore, the head of the treatment facility must assist 
116. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 3 (1982). 
117. Id. The proceeding must be held either in the person's county of residence or where 
a facility is located. 
118. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 4 (1982). 
119. Under MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd 3 (1982), if the head of the facility believes 
commitment is required and the facility is not located in the patient's county of residence, 
the patient may move to have the venue changed. 
120. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 5 (1982). 
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the person in the exercise of these rights if requested to do SO.121 
Additional protection is provided by the requirement that the 
patient be examined by a physician within at least forty-eight hours 
of admission. 122 Anyone held under an emergency provision must 
be discharged if there is no exam within forty-eight hours or if the 
physician does not conclude that the person is either mentally ill, 
retarded or chemically dependent and in need of care, treatment or 
evaluation. 123 Thus emergency confinement requires rapid exami-
nation; continued emergency confinement requires at least some 
corroboration. 
V. JUDICIAL COMMITMENT - PRELIMINARY PROCEDURES 
Screening Team Investigation 
Before filing a petition, a prospective petitioner must ask the 
county to conduct a preliminary investigation. 124 The request is 
made to the "designated agency," ie., the agency selected by the 
county board to provide services under the Act. The agency must 
then appoint a screening team to conduct the investigation. The 
composition of the "screening team" is unspecified in the statute. 
One example is Hennepin County where there is an eighteen-mem-
ber team composed of one psychiatrist, one licensed consulting psy-
chologist, four social workers, five chemical dependency counselors, 
three mental health workers, and four nurses. 
The investigation includes four elements. The screening team 
should interview the proposed patient. 125 If this interview does not 
take place the reasons for failure to do so must be documented. The 
team must also interview other persons with knowledge of the pro-
posed patient's condition. 126 The specific alleged conduct which 
serves as the basis for the petition must be identified and investi-
gated;127 and the screening team must identify and explore alterna-
tives to involuntary commitment. 128 Specific reasons must be given 
for rejecting any of the alternatives. 
The screening team has an affirmative duty to refuse to support 
121. Id. 
122. MINN. STAT. § 2538.06 (1982). 
123. Id. 
124. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 1 (1982). 
125. /d., subd. I(a)(i). 
126. /d. 
127. Id., subd. 1 (a)(ii). 
128. Id., subd. 1 (a)(iii). 
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a petition if its investigation fails to indicate that commitment is 
proper. The prospective petitioner must be given notice of this deci-
sion. 129 The prospective petitioner may appeal the decision of the 
screening team to the county attorney, who must decide whether to 
proceed with the petition and must convey his decision to the pro-
spective petitioner. 13o The statute is silent about the procedure if the 
county attorney should refuse, but the law allows "any interested 
person" to file a petition in the probate court. J3J 
. If commitment is recommended by the screening team, the 
team must send a written report to the county attorney in the county 
where the petition will be filed. 132 The county attorney's representa-
tion of the petitioner is presumed here and elsewhere. 133 The old 
law provided that the petitioner had to request that the county attor-
ney appear. 134 The county attorney may file the petition prior to 
receiving the screening team's report. Clearly, this should occur 
only in emergency situations where it can be demonstrated that 
harm may result if the petitioner awaits the report. 
The Act provides that in conducting its investigation the screen-
ing team may have access to all relevant medical records of pro-
posed patients who are currently in treatment facilities. 135 These 
records, in the hands of the team, are "private data on individu-
als,"136 and use thereof is governed by the Minnesota Government 
Data Practices Act. 137 
The interrelationship between the Commitment Act and the 
Data Practices Act raises two questions. First, the Data Practices 
Act imposes certain requirements for disclosures to subjects of pri-
vate data prior to the collection of the data. To what extent do these 
requirements govern the screening team's access to medical records? 
Second, what is the effect of the "private" classification on the 
screening team's right to disseminate the data it has collected? 
At the core of the Data Practices Act is the requirement that the 
129. Id., subd. I(d). 
130. /d., subd. I(e). 
131. Id., sUbd. 2. 
132. Id., subd. I (c). 
133. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 5 (1982) providing that ''The county attor-
ney and the patient's attorney may be present during the [pre-hearing] examination." 
134. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
135. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. I(b) (1982). 
136. /d. 
137. See generally MINN. STAT. §§13.01-.87 (1982). "Private data on individuals" is de-
fined as' "data which is made by statute ... (a) not public; and (b) accessible to the individ-
ual subject of that data." MINN. STAT. § 13.02 subd. 12 (1982). 
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collection, storage and dissemination of private data be governed by 
the purposes stated to the subject of the data at the time of collec-
tion. 13,8 While there are exceptions to this general rule,139 none ap-
ply to the collection of private data. Thus, the Data Practices Act 
seems to require that the screening team give the proposed patient, 
who is the subject of the private data to be collected, the statement 
of "purpose and intended use" prior to the "collection" of the medi-
cal records. 140 
The second question involving the Data Practices Act concerns 
the dissemination of information from the medical records, or the 
records themselves, by the screening team. Dissemination of private 
data is governed by two provisions of the Data Practices Act. In 
general, private data can be disseminated only in accordance with 
the purposes stated to the subject of the data at the time the data was 
collected. 141 Second, the screening team is permitted to allow an-
other governmental agency access to the data only when the access 
is "authorized or required" by law. 142 Arguably, the screening 
team's obligation to submit a report to the county attorney concern-
ing petitions it recommends "authorizes" the dissemination of the 
medical records. However, further clarity would be useful in this 
regard. 
In the view of the authors, allowing the screening team unbri-
dled access to medical records without the proposed patient's con-
sent poses a potentially serious threat of unauthorized invasion of 
privacy. It must be recalled that the pre-petition screening team is 
an arm of the government. This provision purports to provide these 
governmental agents seemingly uncontrolled access to medical 
records, the type of information which heretofore has been accorded 
extraordinary protections. Regardless of the outcome under the 
138. MINN. STAT. § 13.05 subd. 4 (1982) provides that private data on individuals may 
be disseminated only if the individual has given his or her informed consent. Informed 
consent exists where the subject has signed a dated statement which, in plain language, spe-
cifically identifies the person or agency authorized to disclose the information, the nature of 
the information to be disclosed, the persons or agencies to whom the information may be 
disclosed, the purposes for which the information may be used, and the expiration date of 
the informed consent. ld., subd. 4(d). Further, the subject must be informed of the "pur-
pose and intended use" of the requested information, whether he is legally required to sup-
ply the information, any known consequences from refusing to supply the information, and 
the identity of other persons or entities authorized by law to receive the information. MINN. 
STAT. § 13.04 (1982). 
139. MINN. STAT. § 13.05 subd. 4(a)-(c) (1982). 
140. See supra note 138. 
141. MINN. STAT. § 13.05 subd, 4 (1982). 
142. ld., subd. 9. 
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Data Practices Act, access to medical records without consent 
should rarely be necessary to determine that a petition ought to be 
brought. If the sort of grossly disturbed behavior required by the 
Act as a precondition to commitment has not been publicly ob-
served, then it is probable that the proposed patient is functioning 
adequately and need not be committed. There may be instances of 
course, where hospital records may reveal that despite the recom-
mendation of a physician, commitment is not required. In such 
cases, it should be adequate to rely on the proposed patient's con-
sent in order to gain access to the records. 
In any event, it should be recalled that "[c]ollection and storage 
of. . . private. . . data on individuals and use and dissemination 
of private ... data on individuals shall be limited to that necessary 
for the administration and management" ofthe program of pre-peti-
tion screening. 143 Thus, the screening team should not attempt to 
collect information pursuant to this section unless it can determine 
that the information is "necessary" to its function, pre-petition 
screening. In order to make this determination, the team should 
have some probable cause to believe that specific information in the 
records will make a material difference as to whether commitment 
should be recommended. 
Two virtually identical federal statutes appear to limit release 
of records kept by federally assisted drug abuse prevention pro-
grams. l44 The statutes are based on a belief that drug abuse treat-
ment is best served by assuring confidentiality to participants. The 
applicable records are confidential and may be disclosed only as au-
thorized and "may not otherwise be divulged in any civil, criminal, 
administrative, or legislative proceeding conducted by any Federal, 
State, or local authority .... "145 This prohibition is strict and, 
pursuant to the statute, regulations have sharply limited even the 
use of informers in drug treatment programs. 146 
These records may be disclosed pursuant to narrow exceptions 
to the general rule of confidentiality. A court may order disclosure 
if it finds good cause shown, restricts disclosure only to that required 
to satisfy such good cause and protects against unauthorized disclo-
143. /d., subd. 3. 
144. 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1981); 42 U.S.c. 4582 (1981). 
145. 42 C.F.R. § 2113(a) (1981). 
146. 42 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 
1977); Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976). 
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sure of the information. 147 "Good cause" is found only when the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs the "injury to the patient, to 
the physician-patient relationship and to the treatment services."148 
Disclosure must be limited to items essential to the objective of ~he 
order and to "those persons whose need for information is the basis 
for the order."149 Generally, only objective data may be disclosed, 
e.g., dates of enrollment, attendance, and discharge. Communica-
tions by a patient to program personnel are barred unless put in 
issue by the patient. 150 
Presuming a court uses the proper test and finds it appropriate 
to require disclosure of the data, a subpoena plus a court order is 
required. The order merely removes the barrier; the subpoena then 
compels disclosure. 
The penalty for violation of the statute is a fine of not more 
than $500 for the first offense and not more than $5,000 for subse-
quent offenses. 151 A violation may also give rise to a private cause 
of action for invasion of privacy. 152 
The Petition 
Any interested person may file a petition for commitment. 153 
The petition may be filed in the probate court of the county of the 
proposed patient's residence or presence. 154 The petition must con-
tain the name of the proposed patient, his address, the names and 
addresses of his nearest relatives and the reasons for the petition. 155 
The reasons for the petition must be presented in factual descrip-
tions of recent behavior and not just psychiatric and medical diag-
noses. The vagaries of psychiatric diagnoses and prognoses are well 
documented. 156 Indeed, there is little doubt that past behavior is the 
147. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(b)(2)(c) (1981); 42 C.F.R. § 2.64g (1981). 
148. Id. See In re Doe Children, 93 Misc.2d 479, 402 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Fam. Ct. 1978). 
149. 42 C.F.R. § 2.64(g)(I) and (2) (1981). 
150. 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (1981). 
151. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(1) (1981). 
152. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F.Supp. 1328, 1384 (D.D.C. 1978). This is lim-
ited to jurisdictions that recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy. 
153. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 2 (1982). See MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 10 (1982) 
defining "interested person" as "an adult including but not limited to, a public official, and 
the legal guardian, spouse, parent, legal counsel, adult child, next of kin, or other person 
designated by a proposed patient.". 
154. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 2 (1982). 
155. Id. 
156. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption oj Expertise: Flipping Coins in 
the Courtroom, 66 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974). 
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best predictor of future behavior. 157 Therefore the Act correctly fo-
cuses on behavior and provides that petitions "shall not contain 
judgmental or conclusory statements."158 
A written report of an examiner must accompany the peti-
tion.159 This report must show that the proposed patient was ex-
amined within the fifteen days preceding the filing of the petition. A 
finding that the proposed patient is suffering a designated disability 
must be in the report, as well as a finding that commitment to a 
treatment facility is appropriate. The reasons for this opinion must 
also be set out in detail. This written report is unnecessary if the 
petitioner is unable to obtain an examination and can document a 
reasonable effort to secure one. In this event, a determination to 
commit would presumably be based entirely on behavioral evi-
dence. However, the pre-petition screening team will often be able 
to provide this report. 
The court may order a proposed patient held or taken into cus-
tody and transported to a treatment facility at this point if there has 
been a particularized showing that "serious imminent physical 
harm" to the proposed patient or others is likely, the proposed pa-
tient has failed to appear voluntarily for either the examination or 
the hearing, or there has been a request for commitment of a person 
held under the emergency provisions. 16o The apprehend and hold 
order may be executed at any time and by use of all necessary 
means including restraining the proposed patient. 161 
Anyone held pursuant to an apprehend and hold order may be 
held no more than seventy-two hours, excluding Saturdays, Sun-
days, and legal holidays.162 Thereafter there must be a preliminary 
hearing to determine whether there is probable cause for a continu-
157. See MEEHL, CLINICAL vs. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954); MONO HAN, THE 
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981). 
158. MINN STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 2 (1982). The behavioral descriptions must be specific 
as to where, duration and witnesses to the behavior documented. 
159. ld. 
160. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 6 (1982). The court should consider whether the 
emergency provisions have been properly invoked before issuing a hold order on the basis 
that there has been a request for commitment under the emergency provisions. MINN. R. 
CIV. COMMITMENT 2.02, makes it clear that an apprehend and confine order on this ground 
may not be issued unless the court specifically finds, that "serious imminent physical harm 
is likely" if the order is not issued. Note that this provision is permissive, the court may issue 
the order in these cases, and only these cases. 
161. MINN. R. CIv. COMMITMENT 2.02. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a peace 
officer executing the order shall not be in uniform or a marked car. 
162. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(a) (1982). 
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ing hold. 163 This hearing is constitutionally required. 164 The pro-
posed patient must be represented by counsel at the hearing; 165 and 
written notice of the hearing and the alleged grounds for confine-
ment must precede the preliminary hearing by at least twenty-four 
hours.166 Notice must be given to the proposed patient, his attorney, 
the county attorney, the petitioner, and others as the court may 
direct. 
The only ground supporting an order for continued pre-hearing 
confinement is a finding that "serious imminent physical harm" to 
the proposed patient or others is likely if the proposed patient is not 
confined. 167 The burden of proof is on the petitioner; the standard 
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. "Reliable" hearsay evi-
dence, including written reports, is admissible. 168 
Pre-Hearing Examination 
The Act changes the old law relating to the pre-hearing exami-
nation of the proposed patient in subtle, but important ways. An 
examination has always been required to precede the commitment 
hearing. The Act, however, more rigidly separates the examination 
from the hearing in terms of time. The report of the examiner must 
be filed in triplicate with the court at least forty-eight hours before 
the hearing. 169 Only the attorney for the proposed patient can agree 
to a lesser time. 
As under the old law, the examination must occur in a suitable 
place determined unlikely to affect the proposed patient ad-
versely.170 Altering prior practice,171 the Act expressly grants the 
163. Id. 
164. State ex rei. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980). 
165. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(b) (1982). 
166. The notice must state the time, place and the alleged grounds for the confinement. 
167. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(c) (1982). "Imminent"means "threatening to occur 
immediately." Peterson v. Long, 239 Minn. 319, 325, 58 N.W.2d 609, 615 (1953) quoting 
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947). 
168. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(b) (1982). "Reliability" of hearsay evidence is to be 
determined by the court. 
169. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 5 (1982). Copies are also to be sent to the proposed 
patient and his attorney. 
170. Any questions about the suitability of the place of the examination would be appro-
priately raised either by motion prior to the hearing or at the hearing. The Act does not 
specify the consequence which follows from a showing that an examination was conducted 
in an unsuitable place. Four alternatives present themselves. The court might dismiss the 
petition. Such an action would be premised on the assumption that a proper examination is 
a necessary element of the petitioner's case. More likely, the court would order the examina-
tion redone. However, the commitment hearing must be held within 14 days of the filing of 
the petition, unless "good cause" is shown for an extension of that time period. MINN. STAT. 
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county attorney· and the attorney for the proposed patient the right 
to be present during the examination, though either party may 
waive this right. Formerly, presence at the examination required 
authorization by the examiners. 
In another significant change from the old law, the Act requires 
court appointment of only one examiner initially. The court must 
appoint a second examiner "of the patient's choosing" at the request 
of the proposed patient. 172 This second examiner is to be paid by 
the county at a rate set by the court. The court must prepare a list of 
regularly employed examiners but neither the court nor the pro-
posed patient is limited to the examiners on the list. 173 Each county 
or court may adopt local rules governing the timing of the request 
for a second examiner.174 A rule requiring the request to be made in 
time to allow the second report to be filed with the court at least 48 
hours before the hearing would be proper. This would put the two 
reports on the same footing and give each side t4e same minimum 
time to prepare its case. However, a local rule requiring the request 
to be made prior to the filing of the first report would lead cautious 
defense counsel to request a second examination as a matter of 
course. 
The proposed patient must be summoned to appear for the 
exam and for the hearing. 175 Thus apprehend and hold orders, 176are 
conceived of as the exceptional case. The proposed patient must be 
personally served with this summons, a plain language notice of 
proceedings and notice that the petition has been filed, a copy of the 
petition, a copy of the physician's supporting statement,177 the order 
for examination, and a copy of the pre-petition screening report. 178 
§ 2538.08 subd. I (1982). It might be impossible to schedule the re-examination within the 
14 day period. If the court determined that the circumstances did not constitute "good 
cause" to extend the time for the hearing, then dismissal might be appropriate. A final 
alternative would be for the court to allow testimony regarding the examination. In that 
case, concern about the suitability of the place of the examination would properly be raised 
to impeach the examiner. 
171. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 2 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
172. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 3 (1982) (emphasis added). 
173. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 7 and Comment A. 
174. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 7.03. 
175. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 4 (1982). 
176. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. 
177. A statement from an "examiner" is required generally. The term "physician" in 
MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 4 (1982) appears to be simply an inadvertent vestige of the 
prior law. 
178. Supra note 170. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, service must be made by a 
non-uniformed person. 
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Service of these documents must also be made on the attorney for 
the proposed patient, the petitioner, all interested persons and others 
as the court directs. 
If the proposed patient fails to respond to the summons, an ap-
prehend and hold order may issue. 179 This results in a maximum of 
seventy-two hours of confinement unless serious physical harm to 
the proposed patient or others is found likely. A logistical problem 
arises. If the orders for the exam and for the hearing are ignored, 
two apprehend and hold orders would be needed unless the hearing 
were held within the seventy-two hour allowable confinement pe-
riod or likelihood of imminent harm is found. Given the require-
ment that the reports of the examination(s) be filed at least forty-
eight hours before the hearing, it would be difficult to hold the hear-
ing within the seventy-two hour period of confinement. Hopefully 
this will not result in an unnecessarily large number of findings that 
imminent and serious physical harm is likely without continued 
confinement. 
Hearing Procedures 
The hearing must take place within fourteen days of the date 
the petition is filed. 180 The court can extend this time up to thirty 
more days for "good cause shown." Therefore, one could be con-
fined by court order up to forty-four days without a hearing on the 
merits of the petition. 181 This is a large invasion of civil liberties 
and "good cause" should be rigidly construed. An example of good 
cause might be physical illness of the proposed patient. Any contin-
uance should be limited to the minimum time necessary to proceed 
with the trial. Arguably, "good cause" would not exist where the 
only reason for the extension of time was to allow another week of 
treatment in the hope that the proposed patient would then be ready 
for release. This would in essence use the order for hearing and 
confinement as a therapeutic lever. However benevolent this might 
appear, it constitutes a violation of due process. The penalty for 
failure to hold the hearing in the required time is mandatory dismis-
sal of the petition. 182 
An immediate hearing may be demanded in writing by either 
179. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 6 (1982). See supra note 160 for discussion of appre-
hend and hold orders. 
180. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982). 
181. See State ex reI Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980). 
182. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982). 
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the head of the treatment facility or the proposed patient. Follow-
mg this demand, the hearing must be held within five days of the 
"date of demand," excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holi-
days.183 The term "date of demand" is undefined but likely means 
the date the demand is filed. The demand is, after all, made on the 
court. If the hearing is not timely held after such ~ demand, the 
proposed patient must be discharged. For good cause shown the 
court can, however, extend the time for hearing an additional ten 
days. Again, "good cause shown" should be narrowly construed to 
avoid subversion of the statute. The penalty for failure to hold an 
immediate hearing within the alloted time is discharge of the patient 
if he is being held under court order. However, the petition need 
not be dismissed. 
At least five days' notice that a hearing will be held must be 
given to the proposed patient, the patient's attorney, the petitioner, 
the Commissioner of Public Welfare if the proposed patient is not a 
Minnesotan, and others as the court may direct. 184 At least two 
days' notice of the specific date of the hearing must be given to the 
same persons. 18S Notice to the proposed patient may be waived by 
his counse1. Note that the statute no longer requires notice "by the 
court." Thus, as in the preliminary notices, notice should be given 
by petitioner. 
The court must notify all those receiving notices of the hearing, 
except the proposed patient's attorney, that they also have a right to 
be present and testify. However, anyone unnecessary for the con-
duct of the hearing may be excluded by the court, except those 
whose presence is requested by the proposed patient. 186 
The proposed patient has a right to be present at all proceed-
ings. The right to be present may be waived if the waiver is on the 
record and determined to be freely given. 187 In rare instances the 
court 'may exclude a proposed patient who is "seriously disruptive" 
or who is "totally incapable of comprehending and participating in 
183. Id. 
184. Id., subd. 2. 
185. Id. 
186. The purpose of the provision allowing the court to exclude unnecessary persons 
from the hearing is to protect the privacy of the proposed patient. For example, the court 
might exclude reporters or casual courtroom observers who have no connection to the pro-
ceeding. Those whose presence is re~uested by the proposed patient must be allowed to 
attend. This insures that the proceedmg will be open to outside scrutiny if the proposed 
patient so requests. 
187. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 5 (1982). 
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the proceedings."188 At the hearing, the proposed patient must not 
be so under the influence of the medication or other treatment that it 
hampers his participation in the hearing. If the discontinuance of 
the medication or treatment is deemed not in his best interest, then a 
record of the medication or treatment given in the prior forty-eight 
hours shall be presented at the hearing. 189 
The hearing need not be in the courthouse but must be in a 
"courtroom." This room may be in a treatment facility but it must 
meet standards prescribed by local court rule. 190 In a nutshell, the 
courtroom must be separate from treatment areas of the hospital 
and must provide adequate room to separate the participants in the 
proceeding. The hearing must be conducted in a manner consistent 
with orderly courtroom procedure. 191 This alters prior law which 
mandated a hearing as "informal as may be consistent with orderly 
procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful ef-
fect on the mental health of the proposed patient."192 There is now 
a move toward formalizing the commitment process. There is little 
reason not to hold the vast majority of hearings at the courthouse. 
This will clearly distinguish the judicial proceeding from the psychi-
atric case conference. The cost of transporting proposed patients is 
probably less than having the court personnel travel. Very few pro-
posed patients are too physically ill to travel or suffer any harm 
from the trip. If the proposed patient is temporarily too ill, a contin-
uance would be possible. 
Both parties may present and cross-examine witnesses, and the 
court may in its discretion receive the testimony of anyone else. 193 
All relevant evidence shall be admitted at the hearing. This does 
188. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 10. Before excluding a proposed patient who is "seri-
ously disruptive," the court should make specific findings, on the record, of the proposed 
patient's behavior. Since exclusion should occur only "in rare instances," only disruption 
which renders it impossible to continue the hearing should result in exclusion. 
Prior to excluding a proposed patient on the grounds that he is "totally incapable of 
comprehending and participating in the proceedings," a hearing should be held at which the 
parties can produce evidence concerning that subject. The proposed patient should be at 
that hearing. Clearly, no proposed patient should be excluded on this ground over his objec-
tion since an objection indicates an ability to "participate" in the proceeding. However, the 
converse does not hold true. Since the Act permits exclusion only for ''total'' incapacity, the 
mere lack of an objection to exclusion would not be sufficient to justify exclusion. 
189. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 subd. 5 (1982). 
190. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 9.02, sets forth minimum standards for courtrooms 
which are located in treatment facilities. 
191. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 subd. 6 (1982). 
192. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 13 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
193. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 subd. 4 and 7 (1982). 
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not alter the usual standards, for the same provision requires that 
the court's determination be made "upon the entire record pursuant 
to the rules of evidence." 194 Commitment is a "massive curtailment 
of liberty,"195 and "[t]he loss of liberty produced by an involuntary 
commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement."196 
The dangers inherent in hearsay and the consequences of its admis-
sion are as significant in commitments as in criminal cases. Hearsay 
. should be admissible only under an exception to hearsay rule. Reli-
able hearsay may be admissible under one of the catch-all excep-
tions. 197 However, the general hearsay rule should be followed, 
including adequate prior notice of the intent to use it. 198 
The report of a court-appointed examiner is inadmissible un-
less the examiner is present and available for examination or the 
parties agree. 199 The new law omits the formerly explicit point that 
the opinions of the examiners are not binding on the court.200 Given 
the ultimately legal nature of the proceeding, however, it is clear 
that the decision is for the court and not the examiners. 
The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.201 
There was need for clarification because dictum in Lausche v. Com-
missioner 0/ Public Welfare 202 suggested a stricter standard,203 and 
in Addington v. Texas,204 the United States Supreme Court cited 
Minnesota as a state requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The court must commit the proposed patient if it finds that he is 
either mentally ill, chemically dependent, or mentally retarded and 
194. Id. 
195. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
196. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980). 
197. MINN. R. EVID. 803(24), 804. 
198. See 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 472, 491 (1980). 
199. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 4 (1982). 
200. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 13 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982). 
201. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. I (1982). This is consistent with Addington V. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418 (1978), and State ex rei Doe V. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980). But 
see Matteston, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Inadequacy 0/ Existing Procedural and 
Substantive Protections, 28 UCLA L. REV. 906, 925-28 (1981). 
202. 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974). 
203. Id. at 369. At proceedings to determine whether to grant petition to release patient 
committed as MI & D, the probate court of appeals panel reversed the commissioner's order 
to discharge. The patient asserted that the standard of proof at these supplementary pro-
ceedings must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient is mentally ill. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court responded to this argument as follows: "Although this is the 
necessary standard to be employed with regard to the initial commitment . . . we cannot 
extend it to supplementary proceedings .... " Id. 
204. 441 U.S. at 431 n. 5. 
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there is no less restrictive alternative to commitment.205 As noted 
earlier, the definitions of all three mental conditions include the re-
quirement that the person has recently demonstrated that he is a 
danger to himself or to others.206 This element is constitutionally 
required.207 
Any mental impairment will actually be inferred from behav-
ior.208 Thus, the statute properly focuses on past behavior by requir-
ing a demonstrated failure to care for oneself or a demonstrated risk 
to another. Moreover, the findings must "specifically state the pro-
posed patient's conduct which is a basis for determining that each of 
the requisites for commitment is met."209 Documentation of past 
behavior is crucial given the fledgling status of prediction in the 
mental health field and the well established fact that past behavior is 
the best predictor of future behavior.210 
If commitment is ordered, the court's findings must list the less 
. restrictive alternatives which were rejected and the reasons for rejec-
tion.2lJ The court must find that there is no suitable alternative in-
cluding, but not limited to, dismissal of the petition, voluntary 
outpatient care, voluntary admission to a treatment facility, appoint-
ment of a guardian or conservator, or release before commitment to 
the care and custody of another person or to an agency on condi-
tions guaranteeing care and treatment of the proposed patient.212 
This section is similar to the old provision.213 The Act adds the pos-
sibility that release could be to "an agency". This opens significant 
possibilities to explore new alternatives to commitment, for exam-
ple, release to a hospital. No one against whom criminal proceed-
ings are pending can be released under this section. 
205. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982). 
206. "Mentally ill" see supra note 17 and accompanying text. "Chemically dependent" 
see supra note 13 and accompanying text. "Mentally retarded" see supra notes 35-36 and 
accompanying text. 
207. "Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise context and that the 
'mentally ill' can be identified with a reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional 
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live 
safely in freedom." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
208. See Morse, A Preference jor Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of 
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 59-62 (1982). 
209. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 2 (1982). 
210. See MEEHL, CLINICAL V.S. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954). See also Cocozza & 
Steadman, The Failure oj Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evi-
dence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976). 
211. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 2 (1982). 
212. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 1 (1982). 
213. MINN. STAT. § 253A.12 subd. 1 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982). 
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A guardian or conservator of the person has the power to estab-
lish the place of abode for the incapacitated person.214 A ward or 
conservatee, however, may not be admitted to any "state institution" 
except pursuant to commitment.2ls Note, however, that the Com-
missioner of Public Welfare as guardian or conservator of a men-
tally retarded ward can admit a ward or conservatee to a state 
institution for up to ninety days in any calendar year for "temporary 
care."216 This would be a less restrictive alternative than commit-
ment for mentally retarded wards of the Commissioner. 
The burden to establish that there is no less restrictive alterna-
tive to commitment rests on petitioner, for it is an essential element 
of his case. This is grounded in the principle that even where the 
goal is worthy, it "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved."217 This burden is not carried merely by alleging that a 
particular outcome is best or clinically the most appropriate for the 
proposed patient. It is also important from a clinical point of view 
that less restrictive alternatives be ruled out. There is evidence that 
too many people are institutionalized and that institutionalization is 
often dysfunctionaPI8 
The least restrictive alternative principle has a second applica-
tion in the Act. Once it is determined that the criteria for commit-
ment have been met, and that there is no alternative available less 
restrictive than involuntary treatment, the court must determine 
which treatment facility can meet the proposed patient's needs con-
sistent with the statutory "right to treatment" provisions, in the least 
restrictive manner.219 This is a separate question from whether less 
restrictive alternatives to commitment itself exist. This is a question 
of the destination of the committed patient. 
The term "least restrictive manner" is not defined in the Act. 
Often, the relative degrees of restrictiveness between two alterna-
tives are obvious. Thus, being committed to an outpatient medica-
214. MINN. STAT. § 525.56 subd. 1 (1982). 
215. Id. 
216. MINN. STAT. § 252A.ll subd. 3 (1982). 
217. Shelton V. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See a/so Lake V. Cameron, 364 F.2d 
657 (D.C.Cir. 1966); Welch V. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard V. 
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
414 U.S. 473 (1974); Note, Less /Jrastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L. J. 464 
(1969). 
218. See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972); 
Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care, 37 AM. PSYCHIATRY 349 (1982). 
219. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 7 (1982); MINN. STAT. § 253B.09 subd. 1 (1982). 
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tion clinic in one's home community is clearly less restrictive than 
being committed to a state hospital. Other comparisons are not so 
clear. Some would argue that commitment to a state hospital is less 
restrictive than commitment to a board and care home located in a 
high crime area of a city. Similarly some might argue that it is less 
restrictive to be committed to the security hospital than to be kept 
on a locked ward at an "open" hospital. 
Several factors should be considered in making the restrictive-
ness determination. The degree to which the patient's normal pat-
tern of life is disrupted is an important factor. Thus, while the 
campus-like setting of a state hospital may appear more pleasant 
than the inner city setting of a community treatment facility, the 
latter may more closely approximate the life from which the patient 
has come, and to which he will return. Second, attention should be 
paid to the treatment methods used by the facility. Facilities which 
use aversive or deprivational techniques should be viewed as more 
restrictive than those emphasizing positive reinforcement and vol-
untary participation in treatment. Lastly, the views of the patient 
should not be overlooked in determining restrictiveness. In the long 
run, the patient's cooperation and trust is critical in insuring success-
ful treatment. 
It seems most appropriate to request the pre-petition screening 
team to designate an appropriate facility in the event that commit-
ment is ordered.220 Of course the petitioner may request another 
facility. The requirement that the least restrictive treatment facility 
be used suggests that commitment to outpatient care is possible. 
The definition of "treatment facility,"221 is broad enough to encom-
pass an outpatient facility. A fine line would appear to exist, how-
ever, between those appropriate for voluntary outpatient treatment, 
and hence not commitable, and those who may be committed to 
outpatient care.222 
220. The pre-petition screening unit must detennine whether there are alternatives less 
restrictive than commitment. This should entail a study of the proposed patient's treatment 
needs. The pre-petition screening unit should be able to recommend a facility which can 
meet those needs in the least restrictive manner. 
221. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 19 (1982). 
222. Some patients who refuse voluntary treatment may participate in outpatient treat-
ment as committed patients simply because they have been ordered by the committing court 
to do so. Others may participate as committed patients because they are aware that the 
consequence for failure to participate is commitment on an in-patient basis. 
It follows that the committing court should not reject outpatient treatment as a disposi-
tion merely because the proposed patient would not voluntarily cooperate with such treat-
ment. The relevant questions are, first, whether such treatment would meet the proposed 
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If commitment is ordered, a copy of the findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and of the order must accompany the patient "at the 
time of admission."223 The law is clear but will create a logistical 
problem. Hopefully this provision will be amended to allow the 
committing court administrative leeway, seventy-two hours, 
perhaps. 
VI. POST-COMMITMENT 
The initial commitment period is not more than six months,224 
unless the person is mentally ill and dangerous to the public225 or 
the petition resulting in the commitment was filed while the person 
was committed and the petition results in a period of continuous 
commitment.226 This changes the old law significantly. Formerly 
the only finite commitment related to inebriates; a first commitment 
could last no longer than forty-five days; subsequent commitments 
for inebriety terminated by law in not more than eighteen 
months.227 Commitments for an indefinite period are very likely 
unconstitutional. 228 
The head of the treatment facility must file a treatment report 
with the committing court" [at] least 60 days but not more than 90 
... days after the commencement of the initial commit-
ment. . . ."229 This "commencement of the initial commitment" is 
from the date of the order for commitment. The patient must be 
discharged and the proceedings terminated if this report is either not 
timely filed, or describes the patient as not in need of further institu-
tionalization.230 If the patient is discharged before sixty days, then 
the report is due at the time of discharge. 
This report must contain the following: a diagnosis with sup-
porting data; an anticipated discharge date; a detailed description of 
the discharge planning process; a suggested aftercare plan; an opin-
ion on whether further care and treatment are needed and the evi-
patient's treatment needs, and, second, whether the proposed patient would cooperate with 
such treatment if he is ordered to do so and knows the consequence of failure to do so. 
223. MINN. STAT. § 2538.10 subd. 1 (1982). 
224. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 5 (1982). 
225. See MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 17 (1982). 
226. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
227. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 17 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982). 
228. See Comment, Substantive Oue Process Limits on the Ouration on Civil Commitment 
jor the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 205 (1981). 
229. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 5 (1982). 
230. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Hamline L. Rev. 79 1983
41] CIVIL COMMITMENT ACT: 1982 79 
dence supporting this conclusion; whether further care and 
treatment must be provided in a treatment facility and the evidence 
supporting this conclusion, whether the head of the facility believes 
continued commitment is statutorily justifiable and documenta.tion 
supporting this conclusion. This information must be in narrative 
form,231 and a copy must be sent to the patient and his attorney. No 
hearing is necessary after this report is filed. 
In addition to the sixty to ninety day report, a second report is 
required either upon discharge or at the end of the initial six month 
commitment period, whichever is sooner.232 If the report is not 
timely filed, the patient must be discharged and the proceedings ter-
minated.233 In this report, the head of the treatment facility must 
state his opinion as to whether continued treatment is necessary. If 
this opinion states the patient is not in need of further commitment, 
he must be discharged.234 If the opinion is that continued commit-
ment is necessary, the court must hold a hearing before making a 
final decision.235 A representative of the treatment facility is the 
moving party at the hearing.236 
Continued Commitment 
The hearing must be held within fourteen days after the com-
mitting court receives the report of the head of the treatment facil-
ity.237 For good cause shown, the court may continue the hearing. 
At least five days notice of the time and place of the hearing must be 
given to the patient, his attorney, the original petitioner, and others 
as the court may direct. 
Continued commitment is unjustified unless, after a hearing, 
the court finds that the patient continues to be mentally ill, retarded, 
or chemically dependent, commitment is required for the protection 
231. The Minnesota Supreme Court Study Commission's Report found that many re-
ports by the hospital to the court were extremely brief and conclusory. "Most reports state 
conclusions and recommendations with no supporting factual-behavioral basis." Final Re-
port, supra note 7, at 45. To remedy this and meet the Act's requirement that reports be in 
"narrative form," the report should specify the facts which underlie its conclusions and 
recommendations. 
232. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 1 (1982). 
233. Id., subd. 2. 
234. Id. 
235. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 4 (1982). The patient, after consulting with counsel, 
may waive this hearing. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 6 (1982). 
236. This is appropriate because the facility will have the most knowledge of the patient 
at this point. 
237. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 5 (1982). 
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of the patient or others, and there is no alternative to commit-
ment.238 The standard of proof is once again clear and convincing 
evidence.239 There is, however, an apparent difference between the 
criteria for continued commitment of the mentally ill and those for 
the chemically dependent and mentally retarded. Continued com-
mitment of the mentally ill does not require a finding of a recent 
attempt or threat to physically harm self or others, or a recent failure 
to provide essentials for oneself.240 However, it must be found this 
type of behavior is "likely" to occur.241 A finding that a person con-
tinues to be mentally retarded242 or chemically dependent243 is re-
quired for continued commitment of these persons. It must be 
recalled, however, that the definitions of "mentally retarded" and 
"chemically dependent" include behavioral components.244 Taking 
this along with the language requiring a finding that continued com-
mitment is the only alternative, it is clear that the Act requires the 
usual grounds for commitment to exist before continuing the com-
mitment of the chemically dependent or mentally retarded. 
Not requiring a recent, overtly dangerous act or threat before 
ordering continued commitment of the mentally ill raises some in-
teresting constitutional questions.245 In any case, the basis of the 
court's decision should be the behavior of the patient in the treat-
ment facility. Mere conclusions about his expected behavior or his 
current lack of "insight" should not justify continued confinement. 
If continued commitment is ordered, the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law must state specifically the behavioral basis for the deter-
mination, that the statutory criteria for commitment continue to be 
satisfied, the alternatives considered and the reasons they were 
rejected.246 
If, after the required hearing, the court finds the patient meets 
the statutory criteria for continued commitment as mentally ill, the 
court must determine the probable length of needed commitment. 247 
238. ld., subd. 4. 
239. See MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. 
241. MINN. STAT. § 2538.12 subd. 4 (1982). 
242. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 2 (1982). 
243. ld., subd. 3. 
244. See supra note 35 ("mentally retarded") and note 13 ("chemically dependent"). 
245. See, e.g., Comment, Police Power Commitments, 13 UNIV. ToL. L. REV. 421, 437 n. 
85 (1982). 
246. MINN. STAT. § 2538.12 subd. 7 (1982). 
247. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 1 (1982). 
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The length of continued commitment cannot exceed the lesser of the 
recommended length or twelve months. 
The statute is not free from ambiguity, but it appears the maxi-
mum total length of commitment for a person mentally ill, including 
the initial period of six months, is eighteen months. The statute 
states that "[n]o period of commitment shall exceed this length of 
time248 or twelve months, whichever is less."249 The words "no pe-
riod" may indicate that the total length of commitment is twelve 
months. More likely they acknowledge the fact that there are two 
periods of commitment; the initial period, limited to six months, and 
a continued period limited to twelve months. Further, the twelve-
month limit noted above is allowable after a hearing which may be 
held as much as six months following the original order for commit-
ment. Legislative clarification would undoubtedly be useful. 
At the expiration of the total eighteen-month period of commit-
ment, only a new petition can cause further commitment.25o The 
same burden and standard of proof as apply at the six-month hear-
ing on continued commitment also apply at the proceeding follow-
ing the eighteen-month commitment.251 The length of this 
consecutive commitment resulting from a new petition cannot ex-
ceed the lesser of twelve months or the probable length of commit-
ment needed. Presumably, at the end of the lesser of twelve months 
or the period found probably necessary, the continued commitment 
provisions would again apply and another twelve-month period 
could be added. Thus, a consecutive commitment could result in up 
to twenty-four months of additional confinement before yet another 
petition were needed. However, if a time gap exists between the 
expiration of a continued commitment and the filing of another peti-
tion, the usual provision for a six-month initial commitment period 
will apply again. 
Indeterminate continued commitment can be ordered if the 
court finds, after receiving the six-month treatment report, that a 
person continues to be mentally retarded.252 The Act is unclear as 
to the mentally retarded patient's right to a hearing before an order 
248. For example, the judicially determined probable length of continued commitment. 
249. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. I (1982). 
250. Id. The new petition and determination thereon are governed by the provisions for 
the original commitment. 
251. Id. 
252. MINN. STAT. § 2538. \3 subd. 2 (1982). Note that the definition of "mentally re-
tarded person" requires both below average intellectual abilities and behavioral evidence of 
likely harm to self or others. See MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 14 (1982). 
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for indeterminate commitment. On one hand, the provision regard-
ing the duration of the continued commitment suggests that indeter-
minate commitment of the mentally retarded can occur without a 
hearing, since it allows such an order after only a review of the treat-
ment report.253 On the other hand, the provision for review of com-
mitments254 requires a hearing before continued commitment of the 
mentally retarded. 
Continued commitment for a chemically dependent person can 
be ordered after a hearing for up to one year. Again a total of eight-
een months is potentially involved. The subdivision states: "[T]he 
court shall order the continued commitment of the person for a pe-
riod of time not to exceed one year."255 Continued commitment re-
quires a finding that the person continues to be chemically 
dependent. If commitment beyond this eighteen-month period is 
sought, a new petition and hearing will be required.256 The length 
of the initial commitment pursuant to this successive petition is the 
lesser of twelve months or the probably necessary time. As in the 
case of mentally ill persons,257 only if the commitment periods are 
consecutive will the initial period of six months be avoided. 
VII. PROVISIONAL DISCHARGE FOR PERSONS NOT COMMITTED 
AS MENTALLY ILL AND DANGEROUS 
The Act specifies in considerable detail procedures governing 
provisional discharge and revocation of provisional discharge. It 
does not, however, explicitly define the term "provisional dis-
charge." In practice, a provisional discharge entails a release from 
the hospital or other treatment facility to a less structured setting in 
the community. The characteristics of a provisional discharge are 
outlined by the substantive provisions of the Act.258 A provisional 
discharge is a discharge of the patient without a discharge of the 
commitment. 259 The provisional discharge may entail conditions or 
restrictions on the patient, some of which may subsequently serve as 
grounds for revoking the provisional discharge. A provisional dis-
charge is often used as an intermediate step between commitment to 
253. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 2 (1982). 
254. MINN. STAT. § 2538.12 subd. 4 (1982). 
255. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 3 (1982) (emphasis added). 
256. Id. 
257. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 1 (1982). 
258. MINN. STAT. § 2538.15 (1982). 
259. Id., subd. l. 
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a hospital and full, outright discharge. The procedures for those 
committed as mentally ill and dangerous differ from those for per-
sons committed under the other categories and are discussed later in 
this article. In both cases, though, the Act calls for notice and op-
portunity for a hearing concerning the revocation of a provisional 
discharge, and sets forth the grounds upon which provisional dis-
charge can be revoked. 
F or persons not committed as mentally ill and dangerous, the 
new Act, like the old law, provides that the head of the treatment 
facility may grant a provisional discharge.26o The patient must have 
an "aftercare plan" which specifies, among other things, the ex-
pected length of time for the provisional discharge, and the condi-
tions or restrictions on the patient. The plan must also contain the 
conditions upon which the provisional discharge may be revoked. 
The provisional discharge terminates, making the discharge abso-
lute, on the date specified in the plan, unless the provisional dis-
charge is extended or revoked.261 No provisional discharge can 
extend beyond the end of the commitment period as set by the 
court.262 
Revocation 
The Act authorizes the head of the treatment facility to revoke 
provisional discharges for two reasons. There must be either a vio-
lation of a material condition of the provisional discharge plan 
which creates a need to return the patient to the facility, or a serious 
likelihood that the safety of the patient or others will be jeopard-
ized.263 In order to establish the latter ground, conditions similar to 
those necessary to support an initial commitment must be shown.264 
The Act takes a middle-ground in defining permissible grounds 
for revocation. It does not permit revocation for naked violations of 
the provisional discharge plan. Such revocations might result in 
people being returned to the hospital who did not medically belong 
there. Provisional discharge plans often contain three kinds of con-
ditions. Some are intended to protect the patient or the public from 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Where appropriate, the court could extend the commitment period for a person on 
provisional discharge provided that the criteria for continued commitment are met. 
263. MINN. STAT. § 2538.15 subd. 2 (1982). 
264. Failure to provide food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or an attempt or threat to 
seriously harm self or others physically may result in revocation of the provisional dis-
charge. Id. 
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harm,265 Other conditions are intended to benefit the patient and 
speed his recovery. 266 A third category of conditions might be de-
scribed as administrative. They are imposed to enable social serv-
ices agencies to provide service to the provisionally discharged 
person, and to monitor the provisional discharge plan.267 Clearly, a 
violation of a condition of the second category might not indicate a 
need to return the individual to the treatment facility, while a viola-
tion of a condition in the first would cause greater concern. Hospi-
talization for violation of the secOIid or third type of condition 
would be punitive rather than therapeutic. The Act also avoids the 
other extreme which is allowing revocation only under the same 
conditions as the initial commitment. Making revocation too diffi-
cult might cause heads of facilities to be more cautious, thus deter-
ring or delaying releases on provisional discharge. 
As mentioned above, the Act conditions revocation upon either 
a showing that the criteria similar to those for initial commitment 
are met, or upon a showing that the patient has violated the provi-
sional discharge plan, and that the violation creates a need to return 
to the facility. The last phrase is not defined. Presumably, a need to 
return to the facility would have to be connected to the purpose of 
confinement in a facility. As suggested, "punishment" for violating 
the provisional discharge plan would not, in these authors' view, 
constitute "need" to return to the facility. Likewise, a likelihood of 
physical harm need not be shown in order to establish necessity. 
Rather, the Act would appear to allow revocation as a means of 
intervening at a somewhat earlier stage of a crisis, with the aim of 
averting more serious deterioration.268 
Revocation is commenced by the head of the treatment facility 
serving a notice of intent to revoke on the patient, his attorney and 
the designated agency. Any party, including the designated agency, 
may request the head of the facility to revoke.269 Prior to taking 
265. For example, a requirement that the patient take his psychiatric medication, refrain 
from using drugs, or refrain from possessing firearms. 
266. For example, a requirement that the patient attend recreational sessions at a local 
club. 
267. The requirement that the patient notify the social service agency of a change in 
address. 
268. The most common example of this situation might be a provisional discharge plan 
which requires the patient to take certain medication. The violation of that provision might 
create the need to return the patient to the hospital to restabilize even though the mental 
condition has not yet deteriorated to the point where an initial commitment could be 
justified. 
269. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. 3 (1982). 
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such a step, however, the designated agency must notify the patient 
of the possibility of revocation. All possible steps must be taken to 
avoid revocation. Such steps would entail attempts to meet the pa-
tient's needs without returning him to the treatment facility. For 
example, if the need for revocation is evidenced by the patient's fail-
ure to provide shelter for himself, the first step in avoiding revoca-
tion would be to attempt to provide shelter. 
No hearing is held unless the patient or another interested per-
son requests a hearing.27o Upon such a request, the head of the fa-
cility must file a petition for review with the committing court. 
Alternatively, the patient or other interested person can file the peti-
tion for review. The committing court must hold a hearing on the 
revocation within fourteen days or within five days of a request for 
an immediate hearing.271 Ifno one requests a review hearing within 
fourteen days of service of notice of intent to revoke, the revocation 
becomes final and the court may order the patient returned to the 
facility without a hearing. 
In general, the Act contemplates that notice and hearing, if re-
quested, will precede a return to the facility. However, in an emer-
gency, the court may order the patient returned to the facility prior 
to a review hearing.272 In order to take this extraordinary step, the 
court must find that immediate return is necessary in order to avoid 
serious, imminent physical harm. 
The first sixty days of a provisional discharge are excepted from 
the procedural requirements described above.273 During that time 
period, the head of the facility may revoke a provisional discharge 
without providing the notice and opportunity for hearing otherwise 
required. Although the Act is somewhat unclear as to what grounds 
the head of the facility may rely upon to revoke during the sixty-day 
period, it appears that the grounds are the same as those applicable 
to the remainder of the commitment period.274 The rationale for 
270. Id., subd. 4. 
271. Id. The burden of proof at the hearing is on the party seeking revocation. This 
might be the designated agency or the treatment facility from which the patient was provi-
sionally discharged. 
272. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. 5 (1982). 
273. Id., subd. 6. 
274. The Act says the head of the treatment facility may revoke "upon a finding that 
either of the conditions set forth in subd. 1 [of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15 (West 1982)] 
exists." Subdivision 1 does not set forth two conditions as suggested by this language, al-
though it does refer to the conditions imposed on the patient. Subdivision 2 does set forth 
the conditions upon which revocation is normally permitted. These authors believe the ref-
erence to subdivision 1 is an error. It is subdivision 2 of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15 (West 
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excepting the first sixty days from the procedural requirements is 
that simplifying the procedure for revocation will encourage treat-
ment facilities to be more liberal in granting provisional discharges. 
The Act contains provisions governing the extension of provi-
sional discharges.27s No hearing is provided. The extension of a 
provisional discharge cannot extend the commitment beyond the 
period designated by the committing court.276 
The Act contains changes which allow a patient on provisional 
discharge to return voluntarily to the treatment facility without 
causing a revocation of the provisional discharge.277 Under prior 
practice, a patient on provisional discharge could return to the facil-
ity in only two ways: as an informal patient, or as a committed pa-
tient.278 In the first case, the commitment would be discharged. In 
the second, the provisional discharge would be revoked. The head 
of the hospital could choose which alternative to offer the patient. 
The new law adds a third alternative. The patient can return "tem-
porarily from provisional discharge."279 Under this alternative, 
both the commitment and the provisional discharge remain in effect. 
The patient would be free to leave the facility at any time as if he 
were an informal patient, but remains subject to the provisional dis-
charge plan. This new provision adds a flexible tool which will al-
low treatment facilities to shape treatment programs more 
accurately to meet the individual needs of their patients without an 
artificially induced change in legal status. Under prior practice, re-
turn to the treatment facility from provisional discharge was prob-
lematic because it involved a change in status. The change will be 
particularly useful where patients on provisional discharge suffer a 
temporary setback which can best be remedied by a short stay in the 
hospital. For example, a patient on provisional discharge may have 
stopped taking his medications. The treating physician may feel 
that patient needs to be hospitalized briefly in order to restabilize 
him on the medications. If the patient is willing, there is no need, 
under the Act, to revoke the provisional discharge merely to have 
the patient in the hospital for a brief period for a discrete purpose. 
1982) which should govern the revocation process during the first sixty days of provisional 
discharge. 
275. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. 7 (1982). 
276. ld., subd. 8. 
277. ld., subd. 10. 
278. Flick v. Noot, No. 4-78 Civil 359 (D. Minn. 1979). Stipulated agreement dated 
April 30, 1979, ~ IV. B., Minn. Dept. Pub. Welfare Policy Bull. 75-37 (1975). 
279. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. IO (1982). 
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VIII. JUDICIAL RELEASE 
The Act retains provisions of the old law allowing a patient to 
petition the court for release from commitment. 280 The procedures 
remain essentially unchanged, with four exceptions. The new law 
makes clear what was implicit in the old, that this petition for re-
lease is unavailable to those committed as mentally ill and danger-
ous.28\ Second, the new law provides that the patient as well as any 
interested person may petition for an order that further institution-
alization is not required. Under the old law, only "interested per-
sons" could petition and some argued that this term excluded 
patients.282 Third, the new law omits any reference to "restoration 
to capacity." The reference in the old law was a vestige of prior law, 
under which commitment entailed a finding of legal incompetency. 
Finally, the new law provides for the appointment of examiners in 
connection with the hearing on the petition for release. Carrying 
over the process of the initial commitment hearing, the law provides 
that only one examiner need be appointed. A second examiner of 
the patient's choosing is to be appointed only upon request. The 
burden of proving mental capacity appears to be on the patient.283 
IX. COMMITMENT AS MENTALLY ILL AND DANGEROUS 
In general, the initial commitment of a person as mentally ill 
and dangerous to the public follows the same procedures as those set 
forth for the other disability groups.284 The main differences are 
that MI & D commitments may be made indeterminate, while com-
mitments for mentally ill and chemically dependent must be deter-
minate,285 and the discharge and release provisions for MI & Dare 
different and more stringent than for the others.286 These differ-
ences are intended to make it more difficult for patients labeled 
"dangerous to the public" to obtain release from commitment. By 
permitting indeterminate commitments of those committed as MI & 
280. Compare MINN. STAT. § 253B.17 (1982) with MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2 (1980) 
(repealed August I, 1982). 
281. See In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1981). 
282. MINN. STAT. § 253A.19 subd. I (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
283. See In re Restoration of Masters, 216 Minn. 553,13 N.W.2d 487 (1944); Lausche v. 
Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974), cerro denied, 420 U.S. 993 
(1975). 
284. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 (1982). 
285. Compare MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 13 (1982) with MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 
3 (1982). 
286. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982). 
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D, the Act places the burden on the committed patient to prove that 
he is entitled to release. In order to be released, an MI & D patient 
must, therefore, convince the fact-finder that he is no longer danger-
ous. This is an extremely heavy burden, for a number of reasons. 
First, the prediction of dangerousness, or a lack thereof, is an inex-
act science. The burden of this inexactness will fall on the patient 
who desires a discharge, rather than on the petitioner who desires to 
maintain the commitment. Second, past behavior will be considered 
probative of the patient's future behavior. However, generally the 
MI & D patient who is seeking a discharge will have been hospital-
ized for some period of time immediately preceding the considera-
tion of his request for a discharge. The fact that hospitalization 
entails structure and supervision will be used to undercut the predic-
tive significance ofa history of non-dangerous behavior while hospi-
talized. Finally, even the speculative possibility that the patient 
might engage in violence may be enough to deter some deci-
sionmakers from certifying that the patient is no longer dangerous. 
Such speculation might not, however, be sufficient to sustain a find-
ing that the patient remains dangerous. The net effect of making MI 
& D commitment indeterminate is that it is extremely difficult for 
patients with this type of commitment to obtain discharges. The dif-
ficulty stems from the nature of the patient's burden, which requires 
him to prove a negative fact, based upon an inexact science, and a 
data base which is of questionable relevance. As a result, some pa-
tients who are no longer in fact dangerous may be denied a dis-
charge because they are unable to prove that they will not be 
dangerous in the future. The burden is on the petitioner to prove his 
case by clear and convincing evidence.287 
The Act suggests, though it does not say so explicitly, that a 
commitment as MI & D may be made only upon a petition alleging 
that the person is mentally ill and dangerous to the public. The Act 
refers to a "petition alleging that a proposed patient is mentally ill 
and dangerous to the public," in specifying the procedures to be 
used in MI & D cases.288 Although the Act does not specifically 
prohibit a commitment as MI & D without such an explicit plead-
ing, basic principles of due process would require that the proposed 
patient have advanced notice of the allegations being made against 
him. The Civil Commitment Rules of Procedure support this con-
287. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. I (1982). This burden is required for the original MI 
& 0 commitment, presumably the same standard would be required for release. 
288. Id. 
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clusion. They require that the petition in a commitment case "spec-
ify the disposition sought."289 
The commitment must be reviewed at the end of sixty days.29o 
On the basis of the review, the court has three options. The person 
may be committed as MI & D for an indeterminate period, or as 
mentally ill only for a determinate period,291 or discharged from the 
commitment.292 The procedures surrounding the review of the MI 
& D commitment following the first sixty-day period are somewhat 
unclearly stated in the Act, but are clarified in the Civil Commit-
ment Rules of Procedure.293 
In the authors' view, the legislature intended to require a hear-
ing prior to the indeterminate commitment of a person as mentally 
ill and dangerous. This conclusion follows from a close reading of 
the language of the Act, and is made explicit in the Civil Commit-
ment Rules of Procedure.294 
The new Act retains the basic framework of the old law relating 
to transferring and discharging people committed as' MI & D. 295 
The power to make modifications in the commitment is vested in the 
Commissioner of Public Welfare, who may act only after receiving a 
favorable recommendation from the Special Review Board.296 
The new law provides for time limitations to govern the Special 
Review Board's consideration of petitions. Interested parties must 
be notified of the date of the Special Review Board hearing within 
forty-five days of the filing of the petition.297 Although the language 
of the Act is ambiguous on this point, it seems that this passage in-
tends that the hearing and not merely the notice, must be held 
289. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 1.02. The old law contained no such pleading re-
quirement, explicitly or implicitly. 
290. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 2 (1982). 
291. Governed by MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 (1982) discussed supra at note 259-280. 
292. The third alternative, though only implicit in the Act, is explicit in MINN. R. CIV. 
COMMITMENT 12.02. 
293. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 12. 
294. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 12.01. 
295. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 5 (1982) replaces MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2 
(1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
296. The Act does not specify the membership of the Special Review Board. MINN. 
STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 4 (1982). This omission is clearly due to a typographical error, and 
will likely be remedied during the next legislature. In the interim, the Commission of Public 
Welfare will probably continue the practice, required by prior law, of appointing three-
member Special Review Boards. Of these three, one was required to be a physician quali-
fied in the diagnosis of mental illness or mental retardation; one was required to be an 
attorney; and no member could have any connection with the Department of Public Wel-
fare. MINN. STAT. § 253A.16 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). 
297. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18 subd. 5 (1982). 
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within forty-five days of the filing of the petition.298 The Commis-
sioner must issue his order within fourteen days of receiving the 
Special Review Board's recommendation. The Commissioner's or-
der can be effective no sooner than fifteen days after it is issued.299 
Transfer or Discharge 
The Act sets out factors to be considered in determining 
whether to transfer or provisionally discharge a patient. In either 
case, the Commissioner must find that the action can be accom-
plished with a "reasonable degree" of safety or protection for the 
public.300 This standard acknowledges the imprecision of predic-
tions of dangerousness.301 No ironclad guarantee of safety is 
required. 
The Act sets out three criteria for the discharge of a person 
committed as MI & D.302 First, the person must be "capable of 
making an acceptable adjustment to open society." Second, the per-
son must be no longer dangerous to the public. Third, it must be 
found that the person "is no longer in need of inpatient treatment 
and supervision."303 Under the old law, a person could be dis-
charged upon a finding that he could make "an acceptable adjust-
ment in society."304 Under the Act, the person must be able to 
adjust to an "open" society. This change was intended to address 
the specific problem arising when a person committed as MI & D 
has been provisionally discharged to a prison to serve a prison sen-
tence previously imposed. Under the old law, the person could ar-
gue that he had made, and would continue to make, an acceptable 
adjustment in the society in which he found himself - the prison. 
The addition of the term "open" apparently is intended to preclude 
this interpretation of the term "society." 
In Johnson v. Noot,305 the Supreme Court construed for the first 
298. If the 45-day limit applies only to the notice, and not to the hearing, it would pro-
vide little if any protection to the patient, because there is no requirement governing the 
length of time which may follow the notice prior to a hearing. Since a hearing before the 
Special Review Board is a necessary precondition to obtaining release, it would be appropri-
ate to require that the hearing be held promptly upon request. 
299. MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2(2) (1980) (repealed August I, 1982) provided that 
the order could not be effective any sooner than 30 days after entry thereof. 
300. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 6, 7, & 15 (1982). 
301. See Johnson V. Noot, 323 N.W.2d 724,728 (Minn. 1982). 
302. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982). 
303. Id. 
304. MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2(2) (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982). 
305. 323 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1982). 
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time the language of the old law limiting discharges to those patients 
capable of making an acceptable adjustment in society. The Com-
missioner of Public Welfare argued that he and the Special Review 
Board had discretion to determine whether the patient was "danger-
ous in the ordinary sense of that word, irrespective of the patient's 
mental condition."306 The Court rejected that argument, holding 
that it was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. The Court 
pointed out that the statutory definition of the term "dangerous to 
the public" included the elements of mental illness or deficiency. 
F or that reason, the Court concluded that a patient who was no 
longer mentally ill should be discharged from an MI & D commit-
ment even if he was still dangerous, "[W]e hold that the statutory 
criteria for discharge of a person committed as mentally ill and dan-
gerous - that the patient is "capable of making an acceptable ad-
justment in society" - be construed to mean that the patient is 
either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous.,,~o7 
The Act adds two criteria to the "acceptable adjustment" stan-
dard of the old law. The patient must be "no longer dangerous to 
the public" and "no longer in need of inpatient treatment and super-
vision."308 Neither of these additions should change the Johnson 
construction of the "acceptable adjustment" standard. The term 
"dangerous to the public" is part of the statutorily defined phrase 
"mentally ill and dangerous to the public."309 The definition clearly 
requires a causal link between the mental illness and the dangerous-
ness. The requirement of a causal connection is more stringent than 
the old law, which was satisfied by the mere coincidence of the 
mental condition and dangerous behavior.310 Thus, the new defini-
tion of "dangerous to the public" is consistent with the Johnson dis-
charge standard. Finally, the criterion regarding inpatient 
treatment and supervision is consistent with Johnson. A patient who 
is no longer mentally ill no longer needs to be an "inpatient," and 
thus should satisfy this criterion. 
In addition to the three criteria mentioned above, the Act re-
quires the Special Review Board and Commissioner to consider 
whether conditions exist "to provide a reasonable degree of protec-
306. Id. at 728. 
307. Id. 
308. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982). 
309. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 17 (1982). 
310. Id. 
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tion to the public."311 If these conditions do not exist, the discharge 
is not to be granted. This provision may be meant to add a fourth 
criterion to the three set forth previously in the Act. Alternatively, it 
may be intended simply to clarify that the determination regarding 
"danger to the public" need not be an absolute one, but may be 
measured by the concept of "reasonable" protection. In view of the 
Act's insistence on a causal connection between the mental illness 
and the dangerousness, it appears that the first alternative should be 
rejected. The Act should not be read in a way that would retain 
people under commitment who are no longer mentally ill. The sec-
ond alternative would be consistent with the idea that dangerous-
ness is difficult to predict accurately.312 
Unlike the provisional discharge for the other disability 
groups,313 provisional discharges for persons committed as MI & D 
do not terminate automatically with the passage of time. Rather, 
such patients can be discharged only after a hearing by the Special 
Review Board.314 
Revocation of Provisional Discharge 
Three grounds for revocation of provisional discharge are set 
out. These differ in several respects from the grounds applicable to 
non-dangerous committed persons.315 First the provisional dis-
charge may be revoked if the patient has departed from the condi-
tions of the provisional discharge.316 There is no explicit 
requirement that the departure have created a need for rehospital-
ization. Thus, it is theoretically possible that a person who has vio-
lated a condition of his provisional discharge could end up back in 
the hospital without a need to be there. Such a person would, pre-
sumably, be immediately ready for provisional discharge, since 
there would be no reason to keep him in the hospital. As pointed 
out below, the Special Review Board, in reviewing revocations, has 
the authority to recommend amendment of provisional discharges. 
311. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982). 
312. In Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized this difficulty "[TJo date, no 
valid clinical experience or statistical evidence reliably describes psychological or physical 
signs or symptoms that can be reliably used to discriminate between the harmless and the 
potentially dangerous individual." 323 N.W.2d at 728. 
313. See supra notes 262-63. 
314. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982). See also In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 4 
(Minn. 1981). 
315. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text. 
316. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. IO(i) (1982). 
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Such an amendment might be more productive than returning a 
person to the hospital who has no need to be there. 
Second, it is grounds for revocation if the person is exhibiting 
"signs of mental illness which may require in-hospital evaluation or 
treatment."317 Third, if the person is exhibiting behavior which 
"may be dangerous" to self or others, his provisional discharge may 
be revoked.318 
In general, the revocation provisions for MI & D are more per-
missive than those applicable to the other disability categories. 
However, the main thrust of revocations ought to be therapeutic and 
protective, not punitive. Thus, provisional discharge conditions 
should be carefully framed to attempt to insure that only those con-
ditions which are of material importance in allowing the patient to 
live successfully in the community are included. This will avoid re-
turning people to the hospital for violations if they do not need 
hospitalization.319 
The head of the treatment facility is authorized to revoke provi-
sional discharges. Except in emergency situations, notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing before the Special Review Board must 
precede the revocation.320 The patient must be given a copy of a 
"revocation report," along with a statement of his rights under the 
Act. He then has forty-eight hours to request review. In an emer-
gency,321 the head of the facility can have the patient returned to the 
hospital prior to notice. Notice of his rights in connection with a 
provisional discharge revocation must be provided to the patient 
within seven days of his return to the hospital. Thereafter, review is 
obtained as above. 
CONCLUSION 
Commitment is a legal process not a medical process. It raises 
fundamental questions regarding the state and individual rights. 
317. fd., subd. \o(ii). 
318. fd., subd. 10(iii). 
319. For example, while it may be therapeutically sound to suggest that a person on 
provisional discharge attend recreational sessions in addition to taking his medications, fail-
ure to attend the sessions may not in itself, be indicative of a need for hospitalization. In-
stead of making recreation a "condition" of the provisional discharge, it might be wiser to 
label it a suggestion or recommendation or offer of service. 
320. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. \0 (1982). 
321. The term "emergency" is not defined at this point in the Act. It would be reason-
able to allow re-hospitalization in connection with a provisional discharge revocation under 
the same standards as govern the emergency hold prior to a petition. MINN. STAT. 
§ 253B.05 subd. I (1982), 
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There is no doubt commitment represents a "massive curtailment of 
liberty."322 It is sometimes argued in a particular case that a person 
needs "the protection of a commitment." This phrasing reveals an 
underlying and continuing problem in the field. Because physicians 
and psychologists are involved and because the terminology em-
ployed speaks of treatment or help for the person, the true nature of 
the process is sometimes forgotten. Commitment is viewed by many 
as a benevolent process rather than a massive invasion of civil 
rights. In the commitment process, the law is frequently perceived 
as an impediment to needed help. This perspective fails to recog-
nize the process as a legal one. The decision of when to use the 
power of the state to coerce an individual is appropriately made by 
the legislature. The commitment law represents the legislative bal-
ancing of individual rights and the state interest in protecting its 
citizens. 
The process accorded persons subject to the commitment laws 
is due them. It is not to be seen as merely a roadblock on the path to 
better health. If commitment is viewed purely as a way to obtain 
help for an ill person the burden will shift and the proposed patient 
will, in effect, be forced to prove he does not require treatment. So-
ciety has placed the burden on the petitioner; it subverts that deci-
sion to view commitments purely as a medical decision. 
The new Act provides more due process for those subject to 
commitment. It represents the legislative decision regarding the 
price society will pay for mental health and individual rights. 
322. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). 
